Hiring a New MLRO: How MLROs and Financial Institutions Can Find the Right Fit

As part of our commitment to supporting senior compliance leaders, FINTRAIL is publishing a series of articles based on interviews with current and former MLROs, designed to provide actionable advice to those holding the money laundering reporting function (SMF17).

We recently published a paper on best practice for managing regulatory enforcement actions, based on our own research and interviews with MLROs at UK payment firms. Our advice in that paper presupposes that a firm is genuinely committed to meeting its anti-financial crime obligations, wants to ensure its programme is fit for purpose, and has an MLRO who is up to the task. However, this may not always be the case, and the pressures for the MLRO will clearly be compounded if the firm is not interested in supporting them. Several interviewees stressed how important it is for MLROs to assess a company’s compliance culture before joining, to avoid falling subject to an avoidable enforcement action, or being in a toxic situation where they are left to shoulder the blame without adequate support.

Advice for would-be MLROs

For any regulated function with significant responsibilities, it’s vitally important applicants don’t get swept up in the recruitment process and take on a role without giving it serious thought.  Prospective MLROs should make the most of the recruitment process to ask the firm - and themselves - the right questions to ensure they don’t regret their decision in the long run.

Recognise this role isn’t for everyone. Be honest with yourself about whether you are ready for the responsibilities that come with being an MLRO.  There is clearly the risk of personal liability if things go badly wrong, but this can seem like an unlikely worst-case scenario.  What is more likely is that you will be personally responsible for facing off to the regulator to justify your firm’s programme and answer for any failings.  Are you happy to take on this responsibility?  Do you have the experience and knowledge to run a programme that successfully identifies and mitigates risk?  Especially if this role is a promotion or a significant step up that seems too good to be true, consider if it is and if you’re happy with what you’re taking on!

Interviews should be a two-way process.  Use them to ask meaningful questions about the firm’s compliance programme, resources, tone from the top, and compliance culture. If it doesn’t feel right, be prepared to walk away.

Do your due diligence. Where possible, look into the firm’s compliance history. Has there been significant turnover of MLROs and key compliance staff?  If so, ask about it during the interview process - there may be a reasonable explanation unrelated to the firm’s compliance performance or culture, but try to bottom this out.  Is senior management forthcoming and open about any previous regulatory engagement, or significant audit findings or self-identified gaps?  Do you know any former employees of the company or is there anyone in your network who can give you an off-the-record view?  As before, if you’re not comfortable with the answers you’re getting (or not getting) consider if you should walk away.

Advice for hiring firms

On the flip side, firms can avoid falling foul of the regulator by ensuring they have a suitable individual in the key position of MLRO, and that they offer them the support they need. A good MLRO can ensure the firm doesn’t come under regulatory pressure in the first place, or can self-identify and report issues to the regulator to ensure a less hostile process. In a worst case scenario, they can capably and successfully deal with difficult enforcement actions. 

Invest time and effort in finding the right person.  It can be very easy for early-stage companies in particular to underestimate the importance of the role of MLRO.  When resources and headcount are stretched, it’s tempting to focus on the business and engineering side, and try to secure relatively cheap compliance resources.  However, this is likely to be a false economy if you end up in hot water and have to devote significant time and money to remedial action and regulatory engagement later on.

Broaden your horizons.  Many firms, especially scale-up companies, look internally when they need to fill the role of MLRO, promoting someone from within the compliance team. This person will obviously have a good understanding of the business - and may be so happy with the promotion they’re not too demanding in terms of salary, or involvement in governance and senior level decision-making.  However, unless they worked very closely with the former incumbent and you have a clear plan for their personal development, they are unlikely to have the full range of skills and knowledge required of an MLRO.  Consider carefully whether such an individual will be the right fit, and how you will support and upskill them if you do fill the role internally.

Be honest. If you already know that your programme has issues, or you’re already subject to regulatory action, you need an MLRO who is comfortable managing this situation.  You may not be able to share specific details, but the more you can tell prospective MLROs about what they’re taking on, the more sure you can be that they're up for the challenge.  A small number of people even thrive on such situations - they essentially act as troubleshooters, repeatedly coming into firms in difficulty to overhaul the programme and get it back on an even keel.  Most candidates who have previously undergone a regulatory action will fall into two camps - either their experience will give them unrivaled insights and make them the ideal candidate, or they will be burnt out from their previous experience and have no desire to go through it again!  Don’t make assumptions - make sure they know what they would be taking on and find out how they would feel about it before offering them the role.


Financial Crime Training - More than a Tick Box Exercise

Staying on top of new regulations and emerging financial crime risks is a constant challenge for financial institutions. Firms must grapple with a steady stream of new sanctions designations, evolving fraud typologies and terrorist financing threats, and even entirely new regulatory regimes (looking at you, AMLA). This fast-evolving landscape is one reason why most regulators insist on ongoing training on financial crime.

One of the most common pitfalls for financial institutions is relying on an off-the-shelf training programme. There are a plethora of ready-made AML training courses available which tick the box for meeting basic regulatory requirements; however their generic nature means they barely scratch the surface of what you really need to understand. In order to turn training into a key tool in reducing your risk exposure and an opportunity to develop, firms are advised to consider more bespoke options.

FINTRAIL designs and delivers bespoke training sessions tailored to individual firms’ risk profiles, products, geographies and sectors.  Read on to find out why this matters…

The regulatory imperative

In many jurisdictions, financial service firms are obliged to provide financial crime training to their staff. In the UK, for instance, the Money Laundering Regulations set out specific requirements that regulated firms must meet:

  • Firms must ensure relevant employees and agents are made aware of the law relating to money laundering and terrorist financing, and the requirements of data protection. 

  • Employees must regularly be given training in how to recognise and deal with transactions and other activities or situations which may be related to money laundering, terrorist financing or proliferation financing.   

  • Each firm must take account of the nature of its business, its size, and the nature and extent of the financial crime risks it faces.

Let’s take a look at what the regulations actually mean in terms of who needs what financial crime training and when.

One size does not fit all

The UK regulations define ‘relevant employees’ as anyone capable of contributing to the prevention or detection of money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation finance or the identification or mitigation of the risk of these activities.  In other words, it’s not just the compliance team but also senior management and all sales teams, account managers and other customer-facing roles.  These different roles clearly face varying levels of exposure to financial crime risks and have different levels of existing knowledge.  As a result, financial crime training must be tailored to the specific needs of different employees’ roles and responsibilities.

  • Company-wide training: Every employee, from administrative staff to the CEO, should have a basic understanding of financial crime risks. Company-wide training often covers general topics like definitions of anti-money laundering (AML), fraud prevention, and raising concerns. This level of training helps establish a culture of vigilance and ethical behavior across the organisation.

  • Compliance teams: Those working in compliance or risk departments require in-depth training to ensure they can manage and monitor the firm’s anti-financial crime policies effectively. They need specialised knowledge of the firm’s obligations under applicable regulations, how to assess levels of risk exposure, how to fulfill KYC requirements and monitor customers’ behaviours, and how to report suspicious activity.

  • Senior management and board members: Senior management has ultimate responsibility for the firm’s financial crime compliance framework. It is therefore critical they understand their role in governance and risk oversight, and are well-versed in how to design, implement, and review an effective financial crime risk management program. This level of training should focus on high-level decision-making, understanding risk assessments, and maintaining accountability.

By customising training based on an individual’s role, regulated firms can ensure that everyone has the knowledge and tools they need to meet regulatory obligations and protect the company from financial crime.

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As well as company-wide AML training and advanced training for compliance teams, FINTRAIL has delivered bespoke training for senior management, project managers, embedded finance agents, and RegTech sales teams.

It’s not all about AML training

Good financial crime training covers a wide range of topics. The UK Money Laundering Regulations specifically call out money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation finance, but it’s also vital to understand sanctions evasion, fraud, and bribery and corruption risks amongst others. The depth of coverage required for each topic will vary depending on the firm’s operations, size, and risk exposure - i.e. different firms will require different training content.

Many firms are increasingly choosing to go beyond the main topic areas above, to look at specific topics of relevance to their company or where they have identified particular knowledge gaps.  At FINTRAIL, we have produced and delivered bespoke financial crime training on:

  • Financial crime risks for cryptocurrency

  • Tax evasion

  • Terrorist financing risks for FinTechs

  • Tipping off

  • Financial inclusion

  • Far right extremism

  • Building a compliant product

Financial crime training isn’t a one-time exercise 

Finally, the UK Money Laundering Regulations make it clear that it isn’t sufficient to provide training to new employees when they join a firm. Regulations change constantly, as do the financial crime threats a business faces, and the business’ activities and risk profile.  Staff therefore benefit from regular training - both to reinforce key messages and keep information fresh in their minds, and to keep them up-to-date with new regulations and risks.  For most firms, training takes place at onboarding, on an annual basis, and whenever there are significant changes to the regulatory environment or the company’s activities - e.g. if it expands into a new market or customer vertical, or begins offering a new product. Ad-hoc training can also be scheduled in response to identified knowledge gaps or areas of weakness.  

Hopefully this close review of the regulations shows the benefits of individualised financial crime training programmes over off-the-shelf courses. Firstly, a bespoke approach ensures that the training is relevant to your company’s specific needs, operations, and risk profile. A generic programme may not address the unique challenges your firm faces, leading to knowledge gaps that could expose you to regulatory and operational risks.

Secondly, bespoke training can lead to better engagement from staff. When training is tailored to their specific role and challenges, employees are more likely to find it valuable and retain the information. In turn, this can improve their ability to detect and report suspicious activities, strengthening your firm’s defenses against financial crime.

Lastly, bespoke training programmes demonstrate to regulators that your firm is taking its financial crime prevention responsibilities seriously. By designing a training programme that reflects your firm's unique risk profile and operational environment, you show a proactive commitment to regulatory compliance and ethical business practices.

If you would like to speak to FINTRAIL to learn more about how we can help you with your training requirements, please contact us.

Examples of our financial crime training projects

FINTRAIL was engaged by Finance Latvia, the industry association representing all major banks in Latvia, to deliver a financial crime training programme to CEOs and board members of Latvian banks. The training included a focus on balancing a risk-based approach with consumer duty obligations, and avoiding unnecessary de-risking.

FINTRAIL has worked with the Centre for Financial Crime and Security at RUSI on various financial crime training engagements, including terrorist financing and AML training throughout Europe. Most recently we have developed targeted training on Russia sanctions reporting requirements and detecting sanctions evasion for financial sector audiences in the Baltics, Denmark and the Netherlands.

FINTRAIL provided board-level senior management training for a banking services provider, designed to increase senior executives’ awareness of risks while scaling the business, and how to adopt a proportionate business-focused risk appetite.   It focused on financial crime risk assessments and risks related to downstream relationships, including an overview of controls and oversight of financial partners, as well as appropriate risk decisions.

FINTRAIL created and delivered three online AML training modules to staff of a European payments firm, focusing on suspicious activity reporting, transaction monitoring, and authorised push payment fraud controls. Each training module included exercises and case study examples to ensure engagement, and was bespoke to the client’s products and use cases.  FINTRAIL was subsequently asked to develop further training to their team in Q3 of 2024.


Reflecting on audit findings from H1 2024

While the first half of 2024 is still fresh in our minds, FINTRAIL has paused to reflect on our anti-financial crime (AFC) audits from H1 2024 to identify common findings and focus areas for regulated financial firms.

As always, the regulatory backdrop to these audits has continued to evolve. We have seen changes to the UK regulatory landscape with the introduction of new PEP requirements which came into force in January 2024 and the subsequent FCA consultation on its PEP guidance with updates to be released later this year. There has also been the implementation of the FCA’s 2024/2025 business plan including a commitment to reduce and prevent financial crime with a focus on consumer duty, fraud and financial inclusion. In Europe we have seen the introduction of the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA) which aims to harmonise AML/CFT measures across the EU. The latter half of the year will also see some big changes with the UK Payment Systems Regulator (PSR) mandatory reimbursement requirements for victims of APP scams coming into force on 7 October 2024 and the introduction of the 6th AML Directive (AMLD) in Europe. 

Given the latest changes and pending updates, it is important for firms to stay up to date and continue to evolve and enhance their AFC frameworks. An external audit can help firms identify gaps or areas of weakness and ensure they stay on top of their regulatory requirements.

Key stats

  • The majority of our critical findings related to customer and payment screening controls and anti-financial crime risk assessments.

  • High-risk findings tended to relate to policies and procedures, and customer due diligence controls.

  • The largest number of findings related to customer and payment screening controls.

Policies and procedures

The majority of our findings from the year so far relate to firms’ policies and procedures. In particular, we have repeatedly seen the use of generic policies and procedures that do not align to a firm’s specific product and services or its current systems and controls. For example, policies and procedures have not always been updated to reflect changes to third party systems used or new AML regulatory requirements, despite going through an annual review cycle. This mirrors the findings from the latest FCA ‘Dear CEO’ letter from March 2024 which identified a lack of detail in policies creating ambiguity around the actions staff should take to comply with their obligations under the Money Laundering Regulations. 

It is important for firms to ensure their policies and procedures are up-to-date and reflective of the controls and processes in place, particularly in instances where the documents are used for training new employees or are informing key control areas like internal SAR reporting.

Common gaps we have seen in firms' AML policies and procedures include: 

  • No reference to proliferation financing

  • Not reflecting the latest UK regulatory updates relating to the treatment of domestic PEPs

  • No reference to Transfer of Funds regulations and the controls in place.

Governance 

In terms of governance, FINTRAIL has identified the following themes:

  • Management information - In some instances firms have been unable to easily retrieve management information on their customers and key controls (e.g. number of customers, average number of transaction monitoring alerts, number of SARs, number of open customer screening alerts). It is important for firms to be able to pull this data for the purposes of reporting, tracking against the firm's risk appetite, and understanding key performance indicators (KPIs) and key risk indicators (KRIs) to help drive decisions across the firm.  

  • Resourcing - We have seen many firms operating a lean AFC team structure, which is aligned to their business model, risks and stage of maturity. However, firms should consider or have in place a resource management plan which identifies the trigger points for hiring additional resources or reshuffling existing capacity. This ensures that resourcing is managed effectively as the firm scales and there is no last minute panicked hiring of resources. 

  • Record keeping - FINTRAIL noted in many instances that the storage of KYC information was unorganised and inconsistent. This includes information saved in different folders which means there is no single view of customer information. Likewise, it was difficult to obtain closed screening or transaction monitoring alerts which meant there was no evidence of alert dispositioning. It is important for this information and any associated decision-making to be easily retrievable on the customer’s file in the event of a law enforcement enquiry, or regulator or auditor request.

Risk assessments

Another key focus area for the FCA this year is business-wide risk assessments (BWRA). The FCA review found that in some instances money laundering (ML), terrorist financing (TF) and proliferation financing (PF) risk assessments had not been carried out at all, and in other instances firms had failed to document the steps undertaken to identify and assess the ML/TF/PF risks. 

Similarly, at FINTRAIL we have identified these common findings relating to firms’ BWRAs:

  • Firms are not documenting their risk assessment methodology comprehensively, particularly in relation to how they calculate residual risk. Often this calculation appears very subjective and excludes a quantitative element. 

  • Firms are grouping and amalgamating various financial crime risks into one within their risk assessments, not taking into account the differences between the TF, ML and PF risk exposure to the business. 

  • Firms lack a control library and appear to be amalgamating controls for the purpose of the risk assessment, which is not always reflective of the control effectiveness or how effectively individual controls are mitigating the inherent risk. 

  • Firms are not referencing the sources they use to conduct their risk assessment, taking into account internal data and external factors such as the UK National Risk Assessment.

In relation to customer risk assessments, FINTRAIL has identified the following common themes:

  • It is not always clear what specific risk factor is being considered in the risk assessment. For example, we tend to see many firms capturing ‘geography’ as a risk factor but it is unclear what specifically this relates to, i.e. residency of UBO, country of incorporation, or transactional activity. The lack of granularity could influence the overall risk rating of the customer, meaning it is not reflective of the actual risk posed. 

  • Firms tend to rate each risk factor equally, which does not always best reflect the customer's actual risk. This could lead to a skewered book of customer risk or an ineffective use of the manual override function. 

Additionally, we have seen multiple occasions where a firm's country risk rating list is not up to date (i.e. not updated with the latest high-risk third countries) and therefore feeds into other control areas incorrectly, such as customer risk assessments or transaction monitoring. This means country risk is not being monitored effectively, potentially exposing firms to countries with high financial crime risk exposure.

Customer due diligence

FINTRAIL observed that most firms are implementing effective customer due diligence controls at onboarding. Across most audits, there has been clear documentation for the customer due diligence process and clear instructions for the onboarding team to implement.

One area where we see firms struggle is the KYC refresh process where there are often backlogs due to both poor customer response time and operationally cumbersome processes which divert resources away from other priority areas. There are often no clearly defined timelines built into the KYC refresh process, or clearly defined outcomes and actions taken in the event of no response from the customer. These areas are critical to build out to ensure the customer is notified with ample time to respond, there are clear ‘request for information’ protocols and schedules of correspondence, and clear timelines and actions in the event of no response from the customer. This is to ensure firms are collecting KYC information in a timely manner and that customer information is up to date. 

Another area of focus relates to firms offering downstream services to other financial institutions or payment service providers. In particular we have seen that these firms have not clearly documented their reliance, oversight or outsourcing framework to ensure the effective oversight of these inherently higher risk relationships. Additionally, for these types of relationships we have seen that firms are not factoring in their clients’ AML/CTF control frameworks in the customer risk assessment.

Suspicious activity reporting

Mainly identified through file review sessions, FINTRAIL has noted that internal SARs and investigationsdo not always clearly reference reasons for suspicions. In many instances the team could verbally articulate the reasons for suspicion, but there was little documented evidence of this within the internal SAR and investigation notes. This could affect the quality of the external SARs submitted to authorities. The quality of external reporting has been a focus area for many firms in line with Principle 3 on ‘Providing highly useful information’ of the Wolfberg Group’s Principles of Effectiveness

Screening

The majority of our critical findings in H1 related to firms’ screening controls, particularly ongoing customer screening. In some instances we have seen firms not conducting ongoing customer screening or being unable to demonstrate this. This is often a result of firms not understanding their third party tooling settings or being unaware that their tools have this functionality. 

Fraud 

In light of the PSR’s policy changes coming into play later this year, we have seen many firms make an effort to get their APP fraud controls into shape ahead of the October enforcement date. With that said, while firms have made appropriate updates to their fraud frameworks, there is often little evidence of documentation of these controls. Additionally, fraud risks and anti-fraud controls do not appear to be documented within firms’ risk assessments. Given the FCA’s focus on consumer duty and fraud this year, this should be a focus area for many firms. 

Compliance monitoring

We have seen from our audits this year that compliance monitoring is last on many firms’ to-do lists. While some companies have a documented compliance monitoring plan, it is rarely implemented due to resourcing, time or priority constraints. This is particularly the case for smaller firms which lack dedicated assurance resources. 

How can FINTRAIL help?

At FINTRAIL we are passionate about combating financial crime. Our unique team of experts is drawn from the industries we support and has deep hands-on experience in developing and deploying risk management controls from leadership roles with leading banks, FinTechs, and other financial institutions. 

We have extensive experience assisting financial services businesses with audits and assurance processes. We have a proven track record of identifying areas where clients can enhance their compliance and make their programmes more effective. Our approach is tailored to the unique circumstances of each client, is regulatory and technology driven, and is focused on providing excellent customer outcomes. We offer our clients pragmatic solutions to the most complex challenges and our goal is to ensure our clients can thrive, free from the negative impacts of financial crime.

If you wish to speak to our team about your requirements for an upcoming audit, please get in touch.


Navigating New FCA Guidance on Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs)

The treatment of UK politicians within the financial services sector has sparked political debate and generated media headlines over the past year, particularly in the wake of the Nigel Farage-Coutts scandal (see ‘Timeline of events’ below).  In response, the UK regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), has called on UK financial services firms to improve the treatment of Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs).  With financial institutions’ management of PEPs subject to heightened scrutiny and new regulatory requirements, FINTRAIL summarises the key takeaways from the FCA’s latest guidance.


Timeline of events

  • July 2017 - The FCA releases its original guidance on PEPs (Finalised Guidance - FG 17/6 - The treatment of politically exposed persons for anti-money laundering purposes”) under regulation 48(1) of the Money Laundering Regulations., detailing how financial service firms should treat customers who are PEPs when meeting their AML obligations. 

  • June 2023 - The UK private bank Coutts closes the account of British politician Nigel Farage. Farage claims the decision is politically motivated and files a Subject Access Request, which reveals the decision was made for reputational risk reasons and perceptions his views are ‘xenophobic and racist’.  The case causes a political and media debate, and Chancellor Jeremy Hunt contacts the FCA regarding an urgent investigation into whether politicians are being debanked or denied services because of their status.

  • September 2023 - The FCA launches a multi-firm review on the treatment of PEPs, contacting 1,000 PEPs (from whom it receives 65 responses) and 15 financial service firms. 

  • December 2023 - The UK government announces changes to the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 in relation to the treatment of PEPs entrusted with prominent public functions in the UK (referred to as “domestic PEPs”).  These changes come into force on 10 January 2024. (See FINTRAIL’s post on “PEP Guidance Reflecting Recent UK Regulatory Changes”)

  • July 2024 -The FCA publishes its final review, setting out its findings on how effectively firms are following the FCA guidance on PEPs. It also launches a guidance consultation (GC24/4) on proposed amendments to the FCA PEP guidance which is open for consultation until 18 October 2024.


What is a Politically Exposed Person?

Under the UK Money Laundering Regulations (‘MLRs’), firms are required to have appropriate risk management systems and procedures to determine whether a customer or the beneficial owner of a customer is a PEP (or a family member or known close associate of a PEP) and to manage the risks arising from this relationship. 

Most national definitions of a PEP stem from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations on anti-money laundering which define PEPs as individuals entrusted with a prominent public function. The FCA guidance states that the definition of a ‘prominent public function’ will vary according to the nature of the function held by a person; but firms are expected to understand the nature of the position held and consider whether it gives rise to the risk of large-scale abuse of position. 

What is a prominent public function?

In line with the UK MLR’s Regulation 35(12)(a) PEPs are defined as individuals entrusted with prominent public functions, including:

  • Heads of state, heads of government, ministers and deputy or assistant ministers

  • Members of parliament or similar legislative bodies including regional governments in federalised systems and devolved administrations, including the Scottish Executive and Welsh Assembly, where such bodies have some form of executive decision-making powers. It does not include local government in the UK but it may, where higher risks are assessed, be appropriate to do so in other countries.

  • Members of the governing bodies of political parties. The FCA considers this only applies to political parties who have some representation in a national or supranational parliament or similar legislative body. The extent of who should be considered a member of a governing body of a political party will vary according to the constitution of the parties, but will generally only apply to the national governing bodies where a member has significant executive power (e.g. over the selection of candidates or distribution of significant party funds). 

  • Members of supreme courts, constitutional courts or any judicial body the decisions of which are not subject to further appeal except in exceptional circumstances - in the UK this means only judges of the Supreme Court. Firms should not treat any other member of the judiciary as a PEP and only apply EDD measures where they have assessed additional risks.

  • Members of courts of auditors or of the boards of central banks

  • Ambassadors, charges d’affaires and high-ranking officers in the armed forces. The FCA considers this is only necessary where those holding these offices on behalf of the UK government are at Permanent Secretary/Deputy Permanent Secretary level, or hold the equivalent military rank (e.g. Vice Admiral, Lieutenant General, Air Marshal or senior)

  • Members of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of state owned enterprises. The FCA considers this only applies to for-profit enterprises where the state owns 50% or more or where readily available information points to the state having control over the activities of such enterprises.

  • Directors, deputy directors and members of the board or equivalent function of an international organisation. The FCA considers that such international organisations only include international public organisations such as the UN or NATO. This definition does not extend to international sporting federations.

What is not a prominent public function?

  • The FCA guidance makes clear that public servants below Permanent or Deputy Permanent Secretary should not be assessed to have a prominent public function. 

  • The definition excludes individuals who are ‘junior or mid ranking’. However, firms can assess whether middle ranking or more junior officials could act on behalf of a PEP and therefore pose an elevated risk.

The UK MLRs define family members of PEPs as: (1) spouse or civil partner of a PEP (2) children and their spouses or civil partners, and (3) parents.  NB: The FCA guidance also includes siblings in the definition of family members.  A proportionate risk-based approach should be used for family members falling outside the regulatory definitions (e.g. aunts and uncles); it may be appropriate to include a wider circle of family members in cases where the PEP poses a higher risk.

The MLRs define close associates as: (1) individuals known to have joint beneficial ownership of a legal entity or a legal arrangement or any other close business relations with a PEP, and (2) an individual who has sole beneficial ownership of a legal entity or a legal arrangement which is known to have been set up for the benefit of a PEP.


Summary of the FCA PEP Guidance

Due to the nature of politicians' roles, there is an increased risk that they or their family members and close associates may be involved in bribery and corruption. This should be managed through senior management oversight, risk management measures and enhanced due diligence (EDD) as follows:

1. The firm must have in place procedures to identify whether a customer or the beneficial owner of a customer is a PEP or a family member or a known close associate of a PEP. 

A useful starting point for firms is to clearly set out the definitions of PEPs, family members and RCAs which align to the definitions within the FCA PEP guidance. They should ensure these definitions are used to assess an individual's role and determine whether they are a true PEP at onboarding and if their status changes during the customer relationship. 

The firm should also define how long a customer is considered a PEP once they have left public office.  This should ideally be risk-based depending on the role and risk posed. There should be mechanisms in place to identify when an individual steps down from a public function to ensure they are not treated as a PEP for longer than necessary. 

Per the MLRs, individuals should be subject to risk-based EDD for at least 12 months after the date they cease to be entrusted with a public function. This does not include family members who should be treated as ordinary customers from the date the PEP leaves office.

2. The firm must have in place appropriate systems and procedures to assess the level of risk associated with PEP customers and the extent of EDD measures that need to be applied to manage the enhanced risks arising from the customer.

The firm should apply a risk-based approach to identifying PEPs and apply EDD where relevant. The customer risk assessment should consider all factors relevant to the customer risk and not just PEP status; this will provide an accurate representation of the risk posed by the PEP customer and make it clear what causes a PEP to be high risk.

3. Where a PEP (or a family member or a known close associate) relationship is identified, the firm must:

  • Obtain senior management approval for establishing or continuing the business relationship with that person

  • Take adequate measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds which are involved in the proposed business relationship or transactions with that person

  • Conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship with that person.


Recent changes to the UK Money Laundering Regulations

Since 10 January 2024, the MLRs have been amended to state that the starting point for the assessment of domestic PEPs should be lower risk than a non-domestic PEP, and EDD shall only be applied in the event that other higher risk factors are present. Some indicators of lower or higher risk factors are described below.

Lower risk factors

Product - The customer is seeking access to a product which poses a lower risk as defined by the firm’s risk assessment.

Geographical - The customer is entrusted with a prominent public function in the UK and is therefore considered a ‘domestic PEP’, or is a PEP in a country with similar lower levels of corruption and  misconduct, and similar political stability. If there are other risk factors present then the individual may be considered higher risk.

Personal and professional - The customer does not have executive decision-making responsibilities or is subject to rigorous disclosure requirements.

Higher risk factors

Product - The customer is seeking access to a product which poses higher money laundering risks and is capable of being misused to launder the proceeds of large-scale corruption.

Geographical - The customer is entrusted with a prominent public function in a country considered to have a higher risk of corruption or political instability and weak AML defences.

Personal and professional - The customer’s personal wealth or lifestyle is inconsistent with their known legitimate sources of income or wealth, there are credible allegations of financial misconduct, or the customer is in a position of responsibility or has greater ability to influence decisions.

The table below highlights measures that firms can take depending on the specific risks posed by the individual in question. A firm may decline a relationship with a PEP where it has concluded the risks posed by a customer are higher than they can effectively mitigate.

Measures to take in lower risk situations 
This could apply for domestic PEPs with no other high risk indicators

Source of wealth and source of funds - Less intrusive and exhaustive steps to establish source of wealth and source of funds (e.g. using publicly available information).

Adverse information - Standard adverse media screening or other checks in line with other lower risk customers.

Oversight and approval - At a level less senior than the board of directors (e.g. the  MLRO).

Ongoing monitoring - The business relationship is subject to less frequent formal review (e.g. in line with the regular KYC refresh cycle for updating customer information or when the customer requests a new service or product). 

Measures to take in higher risk situations 
This could apply to non-domestic PEPs or domestic PEPs with other high risk factors present

Source of wealth and source of funds - More intrusive and exhaustive steps to establish the source of wealth and source of funds, such as requesting detailed information and documentary proof from the customer.

Adverse information - More comprehensive adverse media checks (e.g. more thorough open source research as well as standard automated screening), or specially commissioned due diligence reports.

Oversight and approval - At a more senior level of management (e.g. the board of directors).

Ongoing monitoring - The business relationship is subject to more frequent and thorough formal review to determine whether it should be maintained (e.g. annual review).


Findings from the ‘Treatment of PEPs’ review

From September 2023 to July 2024, the FCA conducted a review of firms' approaches to PEP customers to assess whether they were correctly applying its PEP guidance. The findings included the following:

  • Defining PEPs - some firms included definitions for PEPs and RCAs that were not in line with the regulations and the FCA guidance. 

  • Conducting proportionate risk assessments - a small number of firms were not effectively considering the customer’s actual risk in the assessment and risk rating.

  • Applying EDD and ongoing monitoring proportionately and in line with risk - some firms’ policies and procedures and customer file testing showed that they were regularly applying “excessive” EDD.

  • Deciding to reject or close accounts for PEPs, family members and known close associates - firms were clear that they would not decline products or services to UK PEPs or their RCAs simply because of their PEP status. 

  • Effectively communicating with PEP customers - some firms need to improve the clarity and detail of communications with PEP and RCA customers, especially providing more detail in their requests so that customers can understand what they are being asked to do and why. 

  • Keeping PEP controls under review to ensure they remain appropriate - some firms need to ensure they update their policies to reflect the legislative developments and recent amendment to Regulation 35 of the UK MLRs.


Watch this space

The FCA is now consulting on proposed amendments to its PEP guidance, to follow up on its Treatment of PEP review. It is seeking feedback on three key areas:

  1. Non-executive board members (NEBMs): NEBMs are appointed to government departments from the public, private and voluntary sectors. As their role is to provide advice and bring an external perspective, NEBMs do not have any executive authority. As such, the FCA is proposing to clarify in its guidance that these roles should not be considered as PEPs in the UK context.

  2. Sign-off: Under the MLRs it is a requirement that all PEP relationships are signed off by senior management. The FCA guidance sets the expectation that all PEP relationships should be signed off by the MLRO at a minimum with higher risk relationships potentially signed off at a higher level. Industry feedback indicates this part of the guidance causes concerns about the MLRO’s independence. As such, the FCA is proposing to amend the guidance to allow for alternative approaches to sign-off provided the MLRO maintains oversight of all PEP relationships within the firm. 

  3. Regulatory changes: The FCA proposes making targeted amendments to reflect the legislative change that firms should treat domestic PEPs as lower risk unless there are other apparent risk factors unrelated to their PEP status.

Important links


At FINTRAIL, we combine deep financial crime risk management with industry expertise to optimise your anti-financial crime programme. We have extensive experience in creating robust policies and procedures, refining and testing systems and processes, and providing context-based training. Get in touch to find out how we can help you refine your enhanced due diligence measures and incorporate an effective risk strategy for PEPs.

Balancing compliance and compassion: Identifying and supporting vulnerable customers

Financial crime compliance is a complex mix of protecting financial institutions, their customers and society at large from involvement in criminal activity.  Within this wide scope, there is one group which requires particular attention: vulnerable customers. This blog will look at the regulatory meaning of this term, why it’s important to understand various types of vulnerability in the financial landscape, and what fincrime compliance officers need to think about.

Vulnerability can stem from a multitude of factors including age, mental or physical health, financial literacy, or life events such as divorce or bereavement. The 2020 Financial Lives Survey found that 46% of UK adults (that’s 24 million people!) showed one or more characteristics of vulnerability. According to a recent survey by NICE International, about 17% of customers in the UK self-identify as vulnerable, while as many as 67% of customers could potentially be classified as vulnerable when assessed against the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) criteria.

According to the FCA, a vulnerable consumer is “someone who, due to their personal circumstances, is especially susceptible to detriment, particularly when a firm is not acting with appropriate levels of care”.

Understanding vulnerability

Below are the FCA’s four drivers of vulnerability along with their associated characteristics:

An elderly individual navigating complex investment schemes, a college graduate drowning in student debt, or a recently widowed single parent juggling bills with a meagre income. Any customer could require additional assistance, but certain situations increase the likelihood of this need. Vulnerable customers are not just statistics; they're real people facing real challenges.

According to a recent survey by the Vulnerable Registration Service, where vulnerability exists, exploitation often follows. Criminals capitalise on the weaknesses of vulnerable customers through fraud schemes, misleading lending practices, coercive tactics or embroilment in money muling - using deceptive or coercive tactics at a time when their victims’ defences are weakened.  It is an unfair situation where the most vulnerable people end up suffering the most.  And the repercussions of financial exploitation extend far beyond monetary loss, leading to a lack of trust in banks and severe emotional stress.

Consumer Duty: Safeguarding the vulnerable

The FCA stresses the importance of protecting vulnerable customers through its guidance and consumer duty principles. Financial institutions must ensure good outcomes for all consumers, especially those who are vulnerable. They need to identify vulnerable customers, understand their needs, and provide appropriate support including risk assessments and tailored assistance. The Consumer Duty requires senior management to embed these principles into their business practices and demonstrate how they put customer well-being at the heart of their decisions and business strategies.

This approach aims to protect consumers and build trust and confidence within the financial services sector. By adopting the Consumer Duty principles and focusing on transparency, accountability and fairness, firms can provide a positive experience for customers and achieve long-term success in a competitive market. This means carefully monitoring customer results, using feedback systems, and constantly updating practices to meet changing customer needs.

How to identify and support vulnerable customers

To identify vulnerable customers, both interactions with customers and more technological methods such as data analytics can be used. Signs of vulnerability can be detected through transaction analysis, including:

  1. Erratic spending

  2. Frequent late payments

  3. Other patterns that deviate from the customer’s usual behaviour

This monitoring can supplement, and be supplemented by, the work of trained customer service teams who can learn to identify signs of vulnerability such as confusion, stress or difficulty understanding financial products through behaviour, communication patterns, and customer disclosures.

Once firms have identified vulnerable customers, creating dedicated support teams and performing regular account reviews are essential steps in preventing exploitation. When a customer is at particular risk of fraud, for instance, quick and decisive actions are crucial — this includes freezing suspicious transactions before money is lost. Throughout any subsequent investigations, firms must communicate clearly with the customer, and can consider offering financial education and guidance to help them avoid future attacks and rebuild their financial security.

Vulnerable customers may also struggle with firms’ standard procedure and controls. They may not have valid forms of identification, or may not be able to use automated identity verification solutions. In such cases, alternative documents and manual options such as submitting physical documents or using phone or video calls should be provided to ensure inclusivity. Good examples of using alternative identification processes are given in the FCA Handbook. Customer service representatives should be trained to guide customers through these processes and offer comprehensive support, ideally with a choice of phone, email, and live chat, as well as in person where possible.

James Nurse, Managing Director at FINTRAIL, recently shared his insights on BBC Radio 4's MoneyBox programme. He commented on the case of an elderly couple who had trouble meeting due diligence requirements. Despite their efforts, their account was closed because they were unable to provide an updated photo ID or passport. The story highlights the needs for clear guidance on the use of non-standard identity documentation to help vulnerable people who don't have the usual documents needed to access banking and financial services.

FCA evaluation

Currently, the FCA is engaged in an open evaluation concerning the treatment of vulnerable customers by financial firms. In May it issued a 40-part questionnaire asking for information on how financial services firms identify vulnerable customers, and how they design products and communications to meet client needs and measure outcomes. The assessment seeks to gauge the efficacy of current practices and policies, and will assess whether the outcomes experienced by vulnerable consumers are equitable compared to those of others.

By scrutinising firms' treatment of vulnerable customers, the FCA aims to identify any shortcomings or areas for improvement within the industry and to drive positive change that enhances the overall experience and outcomes for vulnerable individuals. The findings of this review, expected to be published by the end of 2024, will likely inform future regulatory guidance and initiatives aimed at promoting greater inclusivity and protection within the financial services sector while maintaining appropriate financial crime controls.

Conclusion

Financial services firms must understand the unique risks of money laundering and fraud vulnerable customers face, and how their fincrime controls may inadvertently discriminate against such customers. They need to evaluate the effectiveness of a range of control mechanisms, both traditional and innovative, to find a balanced solution. This requires strong risk management tailored to the specific needs of vulnerable individuals. By doing thorough assessments and implementing tailored controls, they can better protect the financial well-being and security of these customers while mitigating financial crime risks appropriately.

At FINTRAIL, we leverage our deep financial crime risk management expertise to support clients in treating vulnerable customers effectively. We help our clients:

  • Create robust policies and procedures

  • Refine and enhance their your systems and processes

  • Reduce fraud exposure

  • Engage in targeted training

Our approach includes identifying and mitigating risks relating to vulnerable customers, and ensuring their protection through flexible yet robust controls.


If you’d like to find out more about our services, please get in touch.

300 members and counting!

The FinTech FinCrime Exchange (FFE) is celebrating an important milestone - we’ve reached over 300 member firms! 🥳 The FFE was originally set up by FINTRAIL as a small roundtable, and has grown from strength-to-strength to become the leading compliance network for FinTech professionals. We’ve taken part in public-private partnerships with Europol, the National Economic Crime Centre and others; produced our own podcast (then again, who hasn’t?!); chaired round tables and written industry guidance papers; and put on one of the industry’s most popular conferences: FFECON! And we couldn’t have done it without all our amazing members. 🥰

What is the FinTech FinCrime Exchange?

The FFE is a global network of FinTechs brought together by FINTRAIL collaborating on best practices in financial crime risk management. Member firms cover the whole FinTech ecosystem - payments and retail banking, investment, lending, cryptocurrency, and banking-as-a-service. We currently have members from 43 different jurisdictions around the world. 🌍

Origins of the FFE

FINTRAIL began the FFE as an ad-hoc roundtable with just six companies back in January 2017.  FINTRAIL had noticed that several clients were experiencing the same financial crime typology, and wanted to create a way for them to share this information and ideas for effective counter-measures. The idea proved so popular that FINTRAIL then set up the FFE as a permanent community, with regular physical meet-ups in the UK, Singapore and the USA. These meet-ups naturally became virtual in 2020 due to the COVID pandemic, allowing more firms from other parts of the world to participate. We now blend in-person meetings and social events with virtual meet-ups and webinars to make the best of both worlds for all our members.

Why the FFE is special

One of FINTRAIL’s key motivators for establishing the FFE was the obvious need for a dedicated compliance organisation for FinTechs. FinTechs comprise a key part of the financial ecosystem but are often excluded from forums reserved for established, larger financial institutions (such as JMLIT in the UK). In addition, they often cannot afford the costs of involvement with professional bodies. So the FFE was founded to offer a unique, totally free network for digital-native, innovative firms to collaborate and share their insights and knowledge to fight financial crime together. 💪

Don’t just take our word for it - hear what our members have to say!

What we have planned next

We may have hit 300, but have no intention of stopping here!  We’re going to continue to grow the FFE membership, especially by expanding in particular subsectors and new geographies.  We also want to spread awareness of the power of the FFE within current member firms, to make sure all teams - financial crime, fraud, KYC operations etc. -  can make the most of their membership.

We are taking a pause on hosting FFECON this year, but have an exciting calendar of events lined up in its place. For instance, FINTRAL and the FFE are hosting a series of senior leaders round tables focusing on topics of keen interest to participants, such as consumer duty and APP fraud.  We’ll also be putting on social events to bring the whole London-based community together.  🎉

How to get involved

If you hold a financial crime compliance role at a FinTech and you’d like to get involved, you can apply to become a member today. Be sure to follow us on LinkedIn too to keep up-to-date with what’s going on. If you want to learn more about the community and our activities, check out the FFE’s website page or contact us at ffe_admin@fintrail.com.

You can also learn more about FINTRAIL and the people behind the initiative here

Anti-financial crime audit benchmarking

You asked: “How does our AFC audit compare to our peers?” and “What are the common themes you see in audits?”

We answered….

When conducting anti-financial crime (AFC) audits, our clients often look to understand how their results compare to peer firms across the industry. In fact, when we shared our common audit findings in our ‘Priorities for 2024’ webinar, we fielded a number of questions on what typical audit findings tend to uncover, to help firms understand if they are doing better or worse than average. To assist firms in understanding how their audit compares to other firms, FINTRAIL audit reports now include peer benchmarking for our larger audits.

While there are certainly no ‘one-size-fits-all’ audit results, having looked back over our audits for the past 12 months we have seen similar findings cropping up repeatedly across firms. And when you compare these to a summary of last year’s findings from the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) Priorities for Payment Firms and the European Banking Association’s (EBA) Report on ML/TF risk associated with Payment Institutions, there are common themes from a regulatory perspective that align with what we see in practice when conducting audits.

The table below compares the feedback shared by the key regulatory bodies alongside common findings from FINTRAIL’s audits by thematic areas. Any firm subject to an AFC audit in 2024 should look at these findings against their control framework, assess if any of them could be relevant to their business and consider if they need to embark on any remedial work before their next audit.

When you compare the feedback from regulators with the analysis we have undertaken across the audits we have conducted, we see the same areas consistently appearing in our audit findings. Screening, CDD, governance, risk assessment and transaction monitoring are the control areas where we see the highest number and highest severity of findings. While this observation does not diminish the importance of findings in other areas - e.g. assurance or training - it does reflect that firms often still struggle with the effectiveness of core control areas.

FINTRAIL’s peer benchmarking can compare how your control areas map against peers in the industry and use an audit score reflecting the number of recommendations and the priority level to show where your firm sits in comparison to similar firms. The graph below is an example of how this is portrayed within our audit report. The blue columns represent the average number of findings weighted by priority level across all audits FINTRAIL has conducted over the last 18 months. The black dotted line represents where your firm sits. If your audit findings fall within the blue columns, your firm is in line with, or exceeding, industry standards. If they fall above this, this indicates areas that should be a key focus for your firm.

Whether it is used for your own personal insight, or to include in the audit report you provide to your board or banking partners, this snapshot of your firm compared to your peers can be a powerful indicator of the effectiveness of both the individual components of your control framework, and the framework as a whole.

With the FCA announcing that it will deploy “greater assertiveness in preventing those who can’t or won’t meet [their] standards entering into or remaining in the regulated sector”, the power of an audit in improving a financial crime framework, while also strengthening your position in future regulatory engagement, is immense.


At FINTRAIL, we conduct both enterprise-wide financial crime audits and targeted assessments of specific controls or risk areas. These reviews can cover the full gamut of financial crime risks, with particular focus on AML, terrorist financing, sanctions evasion, and fraud.

Anti-Financial Crime Developments and Priorities for 2024

There is never a dull year in anti-financial crime, and 2023 was certainly no exception. From the introduction of the UK’s Economic Crime Bill, to new crypto laws including the EU’s regulation on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA), a global raft of sanctions against Russia, and legislative attempts to rein in the global fraud pandemic, there’s been plenty to keep on top of. 

It’s early days, but there seems no reason to believe 2024 will be any different.  We are already aware of several pieces of legislation due to come into effect this year, and various regulators have clearly signposted their current areas of focus via guidance notices and consultations with the industry.  So let’s read the tea leaves and see what financial institutions can expect in 2024!


FINTRAIL held a webinar on financial crime trends for 2024, and asked the audience what their main areas of focus were for the year ahead. This is how they responded at the end of the session.

Poll: What are your priorities and main areas of focus for 2024? Please select all applicable answers.


Fraud

Fraud is big global news. In the UK, for example, criminals stole over half a billion pounds in the first six months of 2023 alone¹. Traditional methods of deception are as popular as ever, and are being complemented by increasingly sophisticated cyber-attacks and intricate social engineering schemes. 

While regulators everywhere are acutely aware of the issue, the UK is leading the way in terms of a regulatory response.  In 2023, the Payment Services Regulator (PSR) undertook a multi-pronged approach to reduce authorised push payment (APP) fraud within the Faster Payments System, which is due to continue into 2024.  Here’s what to look out for: 

  • New mandatory reimbursement requirements, announced in June 2023, are due to come into effect in October 2024. These will require both sending and receiving payment institutions to reimburse all victims of APP fraud in full based on a 50/50 split, with limited exceptions for fraud or gross negligence. Read more in our blog here.

  • In 2024 the PSR will be publishing “league tables” of performance on APP fraud in 2023.  Last year’s report on 2022 data called out inconsistent outcomes for victims, and highlighted that certain receiving institutions took in a disproportionate volume of funds derived from APP fraud.  Expect to see more scrutiny of these areas in the 2024 report. Read more in our blog here.

  • The coverage of the Confirmation of Payee scheme will be extended in October 2024, with all financial institutions that participate in Faster Payments or CHAPS required to implement the tool.

In other fraud news:

  • The UK government launched its national Fraud Strategy in May 2023, which aims to reduce fraud by 10% on 2019 levels by December 2024.  The various measures announced under the strategy - such as a new national fraud squad, replacing Action Fraud with a new reporting system, cracking down on abuse of the telephone network, and engaging the tech industry - are ongoing.  Separately, the Home Affairs Committee inquiry into fraud launched in September 2023 will publish its results sometime this year.

  • The FCA issued several guidance documents² on fraud in 2023, which implicitly set out what firms will be judged against in 2024.  The guidance highlighted issues with detecting and preventing money mules due to poor onboarding controls, transaction monitoring, training and governance; poor complaint handling; and poor understanding and response to customer vulnerability.

  • A new corporate failure to prevent fraud was introduced in 2023 as part of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act. The offence is expected to come into force once the government has published guidelines in Spring 2024.

Anti-fraud measures are also being taken in other jurisdictions, albeit not at the same scale as in the UK.

  • In the EU, the introduction of PSD3 revisions forecast for late 2024 will extend IBAN/name matching verification to all credit transfers, introduce an obligation for payment service providers (PSPs) to increase awareness of payment fraud among customers and staff, and establish a legal basis for PSPs to share fraud-related information in full respect of GDPR via dedicated IT platforms.  

  • In the US, federal requirements to report company ownership to FinCEN’s Beneficial Ownership Information Registry went live on 1 January 2024, pursuant to the 2021 Corporate Transparency Act.  It is hoped this will increase corporate transparency and help reduce fraud.

  • While there is no proposal on the horizon in the US for an accountability model or a common reimbursement scheme, the biggest US banks decided to begin refunding Zelle scam victims last year, a trend towards collective action which we could see reflected elsewhere alongside a push for greater consumer protection.

Sanctions

The various geopolitical events of 2023 played themselves out in the sanctions world, with new legislation and designations issued in relation to Russia, Hamas, Sudan, Iran and others.  Human rights violations, narcotrafficking and crypto scams were also all in the spotlight. 

  • OFSI’s annual report for the financial year 2022 to 2023, published in December 2023, revealed that despite imposing “the most severe sanctions the UK has ever imposed on any major economy”³ on Russia, recording 473 suspected breaches and opening 172 investigations by April 2023, there has so far been zero enforcement for post-February 2022 sanctions breaches in relation to Russia. We predict 2024 will be a more active year for enforcement, as some of those investigations bear fruit.  

  • We also predict continuing cooperation between OFSI and the FCA, with the former focusing on enforcement and the latter on ensuring effectiveness. The FCA conducted a targeted assessment of firms’ sanctions controls in 2023 and shared the good and bad practices observed⁴, which will likely form a benchmark for regulatory reviews in 2024.

  • In the EU, we predict a push towards standardised enforcement across member states in 2024.  We understand states with a “less mature” track record of sanctions enforcement are being given firm instructions to up their game, as well as training and guidance to help them do so.

  • In the US, we predict more of the same from OFAC in terms of the nature of sanctions regulations and enforcement, with the upcoming presidential election likely to shape the strategic priorities. 

  • In December 2023, OFAC issued an Executive Order expanding the US’s ability to target financial institutions outside of Russia that facilitate transactions involving Russia’s military-industrial base.  We should see in 2024 how the US intends to use this new measure and whether it will be a significant weapon in its sanctions arsenal, and which Russia-tolerant countries are in the crosshairs.

PEPs

In 2023 the concept of Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) entered the public consciousness in the UK like never before, with the scandal surrounding the closure of Nigel Farage’s bank account at Coutts and a subsequent review by the FCA into whether PEPs are being routinely denied access to financial services.  

Meanwhile we saw corruption scandals involving PEPs continue to emerge around the world, including two former Latin American presidents censured by the US government over allegations of corruption, a procurement scandal in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, ongoing revelations about the UK government’s awarding of contracts during the Covid-19 pandemic, and many more!  

Here’s what’s new for 2024:

  • In the UK, new legislation came into effect on 10 January 2024 amending the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Regulations and mandating that the starting point for assessing the risk posed by domestic PEP clients is lower than non-domestic PEPs. Read more in FINTRAIL’s blog here.

  • The FCA’s review of how financial institutions manage PEP clients, launched in September 2023, is due to be published in June 2024. It will cover how PEPs are defined, how their risk levels are assessed, whether firms are carrying out risk-based and proportionate enhanced due diligence, and how firms take decisions to reject or close PEP-related accounts.

  • In similar moves in the Netherlands, the Dutch Banking Association and the Dutch Central Bank have announced that Dutch banks are also now expected to focus on individual customers’ actual risk profile and to take less invasive due diligence measures for lower-risk PEP clients.

How we can help

At FINTRAIL we help banks, payments institutions, e-money institutions, virtual asset service providers (VASPs) and other regulated institutions around the world to reduce their exposure to financial crime and ensure regulatory compliance.  We do this through the provision of the highest quality consultancy services, based on deep sectoral experience and pragmatism.

We offer support through:

If you would like to discuss any of the topics raised above, or need help enhancing your anti-financial crime programme or ensuring your team is ready for the year ahead, please do get in touch.


PEP Guidance Reflecting Recent UK Regulatory Changes

In December 2023, the UK government announced changes to the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (“MLRs”) in relation to the treatment of Politically Exposed Persons (“PEPs”) entrusted with prominent public functions in the UK (“domestic PEPs”).  These changes came into force on 10 January 2024.

The update means that under the MLRs, when dealing with domestic PEPs (or a family member or known close associate of a domestic PEP) the starting point for banks and other regulated firms is to treat them as inherently lower risk than non-domestic PEPs. This means that firms must apply a lower level of enhanced due diligence (“EDD”) to domestic PEPs compared to non-domestic PEPs, unless other higher risk factors are present (i.e. risk factors other than the PEP status itself).

With this move, the government is encouraging regulated firms to take a more proportionate and risk-based approach to the treatment of domestic PEPs.  This follows reports that a number of individuals that hold a prominent public position have encountered difficulties accessing financing services.  

The new requirements largely mirror guidance previously published by the Financial Crime Authority (FCA) on the treatment of PEPs, but now enter into law for the first time.  In parallel with this regulatory change, the FCA is undertaking a review of the treatment of domestic PEPs, with a report due to be issued in June.

However, the proposed changes have not been universally well received by industry experts, and have caused elements of confusion around how they should be implemented.  For example, practitioners have questioned when enhanced measures will be applied and how higher risk factors will be identified, given the initial level of EDD is now low (i.e. how will firms know if there are any higher risk factors if they are not carrying out robust EDD?). The regulation is not prescriptive in this regard; and as such the onus is on firms to determine what “higher risk factors” may be and how they are to be determined by lower levels of EDD. This has raised the question of whether a firm that does not perform full EDD (per the regulations) and misses something will be deemed wilfully blind or reckless? Will it run the risk of regulatory blowback or prosecution? The upcoming FCA report may provide more clarity, given the speed with which the changes have entered into law, regulated institutions must use their own judgment in the meantime.

Commentators have also expressed concerns that the UK MLRs now do not align with the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) recommendations, specifically Recommendations 12 and 22 which require firms to implement measures to prevent the misuse of the financial system by PEPs, and Recommendation 10, which requires firms to take additional measures beyond performing normal customer due diligence on PEP customers. 

Given the regulatory focus on this topic, FINTRAIL has designed a checklist of points to consider for PEP customers across the anti-financial crime framework.


Download the PEP Guidance Checklist

What areas does the checklist cover?

  • Governance

  • Policies and procedures

  • Financial crime risk assessment

  • Customer risk assessment

  • Customer due diligence and enhanced due diligence

  • Ongoing monitoring (including screening)

  • Transaction monitoring and suspicious activity reporting

  • Awareness and training

  • Assurance


The PSR publishes APP fraud performance data

As UK fraud watchers will be well aware, the UK’s Payment Systems Regulator (PSR) has embarked on a multi-pronged approach to reduce authorised push payment (APP) fraud within the Faster Payments System. As well as new mandatory reimbursement requirements due to come into effect in 2024, the PSR hopes to motivate regulated firms to improve their fraud controls by publishing performance data. This will show how much money connected to APP fraud is sent and received by each payment firm, and how firms perform when it comes to reimbursing victims.

The PSR has published the first ‘league tables’ today, showing data for 2022. The stats cover the UK’s 14 largest banking groups (‘directed firms’, which are obliged to report APP fraud data), plus nine other smaller firms that were among the top 20 highest receivers of fraud.

The performance tables will give firms that are successfully reducing APP fraud losses a competitive advantage, as they will enable customers to see how well individual banks perform in reducing fraud and how well they treat victims.

Recap: what is authorised push payment fraud?

APP fraud is a scam where fraudsters trick victims into sending them money. The account holder authorises the transaction, sending their money willingly but under false pretences.

Examples

Impersonation scams involve the fraudster pretending to be a trusted party like a bank employee or government official, for instance convincing the victim that their bank account is compromised and urging them to move their funds to a ‘trusted’ bank account which is actually under the fraudster’s control.

Romance scams, where a fraudster builds an online relationship with a victim and requests money for various reasons, such as bogus medical expenses or travel costs, supposedly to meet the victim.

Invoice scams, where victims are tricked into paying an invoice that seems to be sent by a legitimate supplier, normally via email. The invoice might be entirely fake, or fraudsters may have intercepted a real invoice and altered the bank details or changed the payment link.

Other examples of APP fraud include employment scams, rental scams, and charity donation scams — where money is sent under false pretences to secure employment, a rental apartment, or donate to a charitable cause respectively.

Key takeaways

1. There are inconsistent outcomes for customers reporting APP fraud. Some firms automatically reimburse victims nearly all of the time, others only make partial reimbursements, and others only consider claims in very narrow circumstances. This inconsistency should reduce with the introduction of mandatory reimbursement for all PSPs in 2024.

In terms of value reimbursed, the figures range from 91% (TSB) to 10% (Allied Irish Bank GB). In terms of volume, they range from 94% fully reimbursed plus 4% partially reimbursed (TBS), to 6% fully reimbursed plus 8% partially reimbursed (Monzo) and 12% fully reimbursed (Allied Irish Bank GB).

NB: PSRs are not currently required to reimburse victims of APP fraud. However, as of 2019, participants in the APP Contingent Reimbursement Model Voluntary Code (‘CRM Code’) have voluntarily agreed to reimburse fraud losses. To date there are nine firms signed up, representing the UK’s major banks with over 90% of the market in payment volumes. These firms would therefore be expected to have much higher reimbursement figures.
 

2. The data showing which firms receive the most money generated by APP fraud indicate a massive degree of variation, indicating fraudsters have identified which firms have weak controls and are actively exploiting them.  Newer and smaller PSPs typically have disproportionately higher rates of fraud than larger, more established firms.  The PSR notes these firms are in the much earlier stages of preventing fraud than major banks, and are not part of the voluntary CRM code. 

For non-directed PSPs (i.e. smaller firms), the rates of fraud-related funds received range from £10,355 per £1m received (Clear Junction) down to £334 (JP Morgan/Chase).  The figures were still widely discrepant but over a smaller range for directed PSPs, ranging from £696 per £1m received (Metro Bank) to just £44 (Santander).

Reasons for some firms having high rates of receiving fraud could include fewer, poor or delayed onboarding checks which would allow fraudsters to open and close accounts before being caught, or weaknesses in inbound transaction monitoring which prevent incoming fraudulent funds being identified and held.

NB: The PSR notes that some firms provide payment accounts to customers but do not manage the customer relationship themselves (e.g. banking-as-a-service providers).  The PSR states that irrespective of whether the firms manage the customer relationships themselves, they retain the regulatory responsibility and are expected to ensure their partners manage the risk of onboarding new customers, conducting identity checks, and monitoring transactions effectively.
 

3. Firms have started to address control gaps, and the PSR believes the situation may have improved over 2023 given greater levels of awareness and industry initiatives, but more still remains to be done.

Outcomes

While these figures date back to 2022, they conclusively show that there is a huge gulf in levels of exposure to APP fraud across the UK payment industry.  Many firms need to radically up their game to prevent themselves being used by fraudsters, and there is a clear imperative to do so given the incoming mandatory reimbursement requirements.  Put simply, unless the most exposed firms are able to reduce the value of fraudulent funds they receive, the resultant reimbursements could put them out of business.

The PSR has said it expects firms to start working “now” to implement the new requirements, beginning by allocating appropriate resources, moving towards adopting a stronger risk-based approach to payments, and making better decisions on when to intervene and hold or stop a payment. 

There are numerous anti-financial crime controls which play a role in reducing APP fraud exposure:

  • Customer due diligence, including identity verification

  • Customer risk assessments, including both customer as fraudsters (receiving funds) and victims (sending funds)

  • Ongoing monitoring, including transaction and other activity monitoring

  • Information sharing mechanisms and responsiveness to peer institutions and law enforcement

  • Use of internal data and financial intelligence

  • Robust assurance of fraud controls

  • Staff training

How we can help

FINTRAIL is here to help PSPs adapt to the new requirements. Over the last five years we have worked with a range of institutions to successfully reduce their APP fraud exposure.

We offer a range of innovative, data-driven services to improve the effectiveness of your fraud controls and enable better identification of fraud risks. For firms considering where to start, we can conduct a thorough, data-driven risk assessment to identify current weaknesses in frameworks and controls and recommend practical enhancements that will reduce your potential liability exposure. This may include product and feature changes/enhancements, customer vulnerability assessments, new transaction monitoring scenarios, or enhancements to your customer risk assessment model. We can also conduct targeted audits of existing controls, or provide assurance and validation of programme changes being introduced to meet the new reimbursement requirements.

Get in touch with our team to learn more.

Sanctions Q&A: Growing sanctions compliance with the business

All firms, regardless of their size, are required to comply with sanctions. With the potential of significant fines, business restrictions and reputational damage, getting sanctions wrong can have significant consequences, and it is important that firms ensure the controls put in place on day one are still fit for purpose as the business grows, or when regulatory requirements change.

In this rapid fire Q&A with FINTRAIL Senior Consultant & Sanctions Lead Emil Dall, we will explore how sanctions compliance programmes can and should adapt over time.

Q1 - Why is it important to adapt sanctions compliance over time?

There is no one size fits all when it comes to sanctions compliance. For example, a FinTech operating only in the UK may initially find their sanctions risk sufficiently covered by deploying a simple name screening solution, and focusing exclusively on the UK sanctions list. However, as the company grows over time, their sanctions profile will change as well. This could include:

  • An expanded product offering, which may be impacted by sectoral sanctions.

  • A growth in customer base, leading to potentially more sanctions alerts and possible matches.

  • Expanding to new markets, and introducing cross-border payments to and from jurisdictions that are at higher risk for sanctions.

FinTechs have unique product features and selling points to distinguish themselves from their competition, however this can also create novel sanctions risks. Firms should carefully consider what controls adequately address their sanctions risk. For example, while OFAC does not prescribe what specific controls firms must use, the agency expects firms “to employ a risk-based approach to sanctions compliance by developing, implementing, and routinely updating a sanctions compliance programme”.

Q2 - If my products or customers remain the same, can our sanctions compliance programme also stay the same?

No. Even if a firm’s products or customers do not change significantly over time, sanctions compliance cannot be left to its own devices. Sanctions risk is ever-changing, particularly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The number of designated individuals and entities has increased exponentially, with the networks of those designated extending far beyond just Russia, and novel sectoral sanctions have been imposed prohibiting certain services, trades or activities connected with Russia. 

Staying up to date with regulatory requirements and how your products may be affected by specific prohibitions is key. In September 2023 the Financial Conduct Authority in the UK highlighted that when it comes to Russia sanctions, “firms that had taken advanced planning for possible sanctions before February 2022 were in a better position to implement [them]”. Staying on top of regulatory requirements and being prepared for what might come next is now expected by regulators.

Q3 - What are the key components of an effective sanctions compliance programme?

A sanctions compliance programme will look different in every firm, depending on its size and operations. Some components may be present from day one, and become more sophisticated over time, while other components will only be introduced as the firm grows. This includes:

  • A sanctions risk assessment, perhaps initially conducted as part of a wider enterprise wide risk assessment, or later as a standalone sanctions risk assessment.

  • Sanctions screening systems, which should be tested to ensure they work as intended and calibrated over time in line with the firm’s customer portfolio and sanctions risk. 

  • Governance and oversight, including maintaining up-to-date policies, operating procedures, reporting obligations across all jurisdictions where the firm operates, and management information on sanctions trends.

Q4 - How can FINTRAIL help?

FINTRAIL can assist businesses that do not yet have a built-out sanctions compliance function, as well as those who are looking to enhance their existing sanctions policies and procedures. 

Regardless of where you are in your sanctions compliance journey, we assist clients of all sizes build and maintain an effective sanctions compliance programme that meets regulatory expectations - this includes development or enhancement of sanctions policies and procedures, sanctions risk assessments, sanctions screening and controls, and carrying out audits of sanctions compliance programmes. 

In addition, we are sanctions policy experts with experience working with governments across North America, Europe and Asia on sanctions design and implementation, and we can help firms be tuned into relevant changes in the fast-moving sanctions regulatory landscape.



Travel Rule: State of Play

Introduction

With deadlines looming in many jurisdictions to implement FATF Recommendation 16, also known as the “travel rule”, crypto has been front and centre of the anti-financial crime spotlight. While the travel rule was first adopted in 2019 by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a recent targeted update from June 2023 shows that member countries struggle to implement it. According to the update, over half of those surveyed have not taken any measures to implement the rule. While progress has been made since the survey, the topic of the travel rule and the associated ‘sunrise issue’, which refers to its uneven and phased worldwide adoption, continues to be significant. Delving deeper into this topic, FINTRAIL explores some common challenges firms face in implementing the crypto travel rule while unpacking the state of play in key jurisdictions.

A refresher: what is the travel rule? 💸

The travel rule, which comes under FATF’s Recommendation 16, “requires virtual asset service providers (VASPs) to obtain, hold, and transmit required originator and beneficiary information, immediately and securely, when conducting virtual asset (VA) transfers.” By doing so, VASPs and financial institutions can conduct effective sanction screening, detect suspicious transactions, and essentially bring crypto assets under the same regulatory umbrella as other types of financial transfers such as wires. The threshold amount is $1,000 or €1,000 - meaning that any transfer over this amount requires identifiable information to be shared on the originator and beneficiary.

The travel rule stipulates that transactions above $1,000 or €1,000 require the following information to be transmitted:

The originator VASP

  • The originator’s name

  • The originator’s wallet address

  • The originator’s physical address, national identity number, customer identification number, or date and place of birth

The beneficiary VASP

  • The beneficiary’s name

  • The beneficiary’s wallet address

For transactions below the $1,000 or €1,000 threshold, the following information must still be transmitted:

The originator VASP 

  • The originator’s name

  • The originator’s VA wallet address or a unique transaction reference number for VA transfers

The beneficiary VASP 

  • The beneficiary’s name 

  • The beneficiary’s VA wallet address or a unique transaction reference number for VA transfers

As countries work to transpose the travel rule into their own regulatory frameworks at varying rates, here’s the current state of play for key jurisdictions:

The United Kingdom 🇬🇧

On 17th August the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) published a statement outlining the expectations for UK businesses complying with the travel rule. Since the publication of the FATF Recommendation, the UK has amended its Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing regulations (MLRs) accordingly. The recent statement from the FCA highlights that firms must adhere to the travel rule from 1 September 2023.

In addition to full compliance with the rule, the expectations outlined by the FCA include taking reasonable steps and due diligence for compliance, regularly reviewing the implementation status of the rule in other jurisdictions to adapt business processes appropriately, and responsibility for compliance even when using third-party suppliers. 

When sending crypto asset transfers to a jurisdiction without the travel rule, the FCA specifies that firms take all reasonable steps to indicate that the firm can receive the required information. If the firm cannot, the UK firm must abide by the MLRs, collecting, storing, and verifying the information appropriately. Receiving crypto-asset transfers from a jurisdiction without the travel rule requires a risk-based assessment before making the funds available to the beneficiary. Decisions should consider the jurisdiction(s) in which the sending firm operates and the status of the travel rule in those countries.

The European Union 🇪🇺

In the EU, the Transfer of Funds Regulation will implement FATF’s travel rule and extend wire transfer requirements to crypto providers. The regulation will have no minimum, meaning all transactions will require identification information to be shared, regardless of the amount. The law also covers transactions above €1,000 from self-hosted wallets when interacting with hosted wallets managed by crypto-asset service providers.  

Explainer: What are self-hosted wallets?

Self-hosted wallets are digital wallets where the user has sole control over their private keys, permitting them to store, send, and receive crypto without needing a centralised platform or intermediary.

The regulation will apply from 30 December 2024.

The United States 🇺🇸

In May 2019, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) published clarifying guidance on applying existing regulations to convertible virtual currencies. The consolidating document clarifies the inclusion of virtual currencies in the travel rule initially created for fiat currencies. The threshold in the US is currently $3,000, though a proposed rule change was made to lower the threshold to $250 for international transfers, though this has not yet gone into effect.

Challenges to implementation

Among the notable challenges to the travel rule’s implementation, the ‘sunrise issue’ speaks to the staggered and nonuniform application of the rule across jurisdictions. For example, Singapore and Japan have already implemented the travel rule, on 28 January 2020 and 1 June 2023 respectively, whereas countries in the EU have until the end of 2024. These different timelines pose challenges as firms must send information to firms in countries that may not be mandated to receive or transmit data. Additionally, there may be jurisdictional variances as countries transpose the travel rule into their own national regulations differently. The United States, for example, currently has a threshold of $3,000 rather than FATF’s recommended $1,000. These differences mean VASPs are tasked with navigating cross-border variations. 

Recognising the uneven global application, the FATF noted that VASPs should consider additional control measures for countries with weak implementation, such as rigorous monitoring of transactions with VASPs based in higher risk countries, “placing amount restrictions on transactions, or intensive and frequent due diligence.” 

Another key practical challenge is technology requirements, as the rule requires firms to deploy complex technology solutions that were previously unavailable. In Australia, where the travel rule has yet to be transposed into national law, officials said in 2021 that there were insufficient technological capabilities to implement the rule adequately.  VASPs must exchange data with other VASPs through messaging protocols, and varying formats raise interoperability issues. Other concerns stem from navigating data privacy, data processing requirements, and security concerns. All these factors make the practical implementation of the travel rule a daunting task.

How FINTRAIL can help

FINTRAIL is experienced in working with VASPs, including cryptocurrency trading platforms and traditional firms with exposure to crypto-assets in the UK, Europe, APAC and globally. We help VASPs around the world ensure regulatory compliance and an effective implementation of the travel rule. Through the provision of the highest quality consultancy services, based on deep sectoral experience and pragmatism, we help firms reduce their exposure to financial crime.


PEPs in Perspective: How to manage politically exposed clients

Introduction

Earlier this month, Chancellor Jeremy Hunt asked the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) to investigate whether financial institutions are closing politicians' bank accounts on a widespread basis. Sparked by a controversy involving former Brexit Party leader Nigel Farage, who accused the private bank Coutts of closing his account because of his political views, the topic of politically exposed persons (PEPs) and debanking has come to the fore. The discussion arises against the backdrop of a significant increase in account closures because of anti-money laundering efforts over the last few years.

The FCA has now issued a data request to banks, specifically asking if accounts have been closed due to political opinions and has confirmed it aims to provide an initial assessment by mid-September - a phenomenally fast turnaround for a potentially tricky exercise. 

Payment account regulations in the UK state that everyone has a right to open a basic bank account. Financial service providers cannot discriminate on the basis of protected characteristics such as gender, religion, and race, as per non-discrimination legislation. However, outside of these protections, financial institutions are entitled to decide which customers they choose to bank in line with their risk appetite. For example, firms may turn away specific industries, such as adult entertainment, gambling, or manufacturers of firearms and ammunition, if they are deemed too risky.  While the Coutts case focuses more on political views and reputation rather than financial crime risk, a buzz has been created around PEPs and debanking in an anti-financial crime context.  

In response to this recent development, FINTRAIL has looked at some of the requirements and best practices for financial institutions when dealing with PEPs.

The basics

First, let’s visit the definition of what a PEP actually is. While each jurisdiction has its own specific meaning in line with its legal and regulatory framework, the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) influential definition is “an individual who is or has been entrusted with a prominent public function”. Family members and close associates of PEPs may also receive PEP designations.   PEPs can be further broken down into the following categories: 

  • Foreign PEPs: individuals given significant public roles by a foreign country.

  • Domestic PEPs: individuals given significant public roles within their own country.

  • International organisation PEPs: senior management in international organisations such as UN bodies, including directors, deputy directors, board members, or those with similar responsibilities.

The reason financial institutions are required to identify PEPs is that they pose a heightened risk of bribery and corruption, due to the opportunities afforded to them by their political office

In the UK, a PEP, as defined by the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Transfer of Funds (Information of the Payer) Regulations 2017 is “an individual who is entrusted with prominent public functions, other than as a middle-ranking or more junior official.” The regulations include some helpful but non-exhaustive examples such as heads of state, ambassadors, and members of the supreme court. They state regulated institutions must be able to identify if a customer is either a PEP or “a family member or a known close associate of a PEP”.

PEP obligations for financial institutions

Each country differs in what it requires of financial institutions when it comes to PEPs. UK regulations state that financial institutions should place PEPs and their family members under enhanced due diligence. Similarly, in other jurisdictions like Singapore and Australia, regulators require financial institutions to apply enhanced due diligence to PEPs. While the exact nature of what constitutes enhanced due diligence has no prescriptive meaning and should form part of a risk-based approach, it commonly entails additional ongoing monitoring and screening measures such as adverse media screening. Some other examples of enhanced due diligence measures compiled by the FCA include establishing the source of wealth to ensure its legitimacy, commissioning external third party intelligence reports where necessary, and obtaining more robust verification of customer information from a reliable and independent source. 

In the United States, the term PEP refers to foreign individuals “who are or have been entrusted with a prominent public function, as well as their immediate family members and close associates.” There is no obligation to identify domestic PEPs.  While not expressly requiring PEPs to undergo any enhanced due diligence, firms must take the appropriate action in line with a risk-based approach and the client’s risk profile. Notably, recent developments with the Anti Money Laundering Act 2020 have increased scrutiny on PEPs, encouraging financial institutions to enhance their policies. 

Not all PEPs are created equal

In the last decade, PEPs have come into the spotlight for illicit activities and corruption revealed in investigations by organisations like the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, such as the Panama Papers and Luanda Leaks. More recently, news has centred on Russian kleptocrats and the global sanction regimes targeting them, bringing the abuse of power of those politically connected to Vladimir Putin into public discourse. But are all PEPs automatically high-risk clients? 

While PEPs are generally considered at higher risk for bribery and corruption, this is contingent on a few factors. The FCA’s guidance outlines some of the indicators that make a PEP a higher-risk client for financial institutions, including involvement with a product “capable of being misused to launder the proceeds of large-scale corruption.” Another indicator centres on geographical considerations, like if a PEP is “entrusted with a prominent public function in a country that is considered to have a higher risk of corruption”, taking into account a range of factors like political instability, widespread organised criminality, human rights abuses and more.  Another consideration is the personal and professional nature of the PEP - if they have wealth inconsistent with known legitimate sources or are responsible for large public procurement exercises.  

So while there is a regulatory obligation in most countries to apply extra measures to all PEPs, not all genuinely pose a significant risk of bribery or corruption. It is also vital to note that conducting enhanced scrutiny of PEPs should never be done under the assumption that all politicians (or their families or close associates) are likely criminal actors. The overwhelming majority are not. In fact, a 2017 FCA guide explicitly states that firms are “required to recognise the lower risk” of UK PEPs, or PEPs from a country that has “similarly transparent anti-corruption regimes”. Depending on a holistic range of risk factors, some may be lower risk than others.  Firms should effectively identify and monitor PEPs to ensure that in the event suspicious activity does occur, you will flag it, investigate it, and report it. This approach is foundational to an effective anti-financial crime programme. 

Best practices

Firms should regularly revisit their policies concerning PEPs to ensure their alignment with their internal risk appetite and risk-based approach. 

Some areas of focus include:

  • Having a clear risk appetite statement regarding PEPs, based on a nuanced understanding of the financial crime risk they pose whilst remembering simply banning PEPs is not appropriate.

  • Fortifying enhanced due diligence measures and processes to ensure the risks associated with PEPs are truly understood and mitigation measures are appropriate.

  • Regularly training staff on how to identify a PEP, the associated risks, and the processes to be followed once a PEP is identified.

  • Designing clear onboarding processes and exit strategies for PEPs.

READ NEXT: Navigating New FCA PEP Guidance


At FINTRAIL, we combine deep financial crime risk management with industry expertise to optimise your anti-financial crime programmes. We’re here to support you in creating robust policies and procedures; refining, enhancing or testing your systems and processes; and providing context-based training to your teams. Get in touch to find out how we can help you refine your enhanced due diligence measures and incorporate an effective risk strategy for PEPs in a practical and efficient way. 


The Real (E)state of Money Laundering in Property

Introduction

Money laundering in real estate has been a hot topic of late, with explosive headlines from the UK to the UAE to Canada to Australia. Most glaringly, dirty money from Russia has attracted tremendous attention following last year’s unprecedented sanction regimes brought on by the Ukrainian invasion. In particular, the UK real estate market has received widespread criticism for serving as a haven for questionable funds from Russian oligarchs, giving popularity to the term ‘Londongrad’. Research by Transparency International has estimated £1.5 billion of UK property has been purchased by Russians accused of corruption or with links to the Kremlin. Such reports sparked outrage and even legislation requiring the beneficial owners of property to be disclosed in a new public register. 

In light of this crackdown in the UK, Russian cash is seemingly heading to places like Dubai instead. According to one source, since the Ukrainian invasion, the “Russian population in the UAE has risen fivefold to as many as 500,000”, propping up the luxury real estate market. But even before the war, Dubai was a popular refuge for criminals from all over the world looking to stash their ill-gotten gains. Last year the Dubai Uncovered property leak disclosed data from 2020 on criminals, officials, and sanctioned politicians with ties to the Dubai property market.  One of the people identified in the leak is a Czech politician named Libor Novák who is accused of corruption, listed as owning six apartments in the Dubai Marina worth nearly $2.7 million. Another illicit actor is the Estonian businessman Marko Taylor, a convicted fraudster listed as owning a villa and an apartment worth over $1 million. 

These instances are far from isolated. Reports in Australia (where it is thought that criminals linked to China laundered $1 billion through real estate in 2020), Canada, and the United States demonstrate the popularity of real estate as a medium to hide and launder illicit proceeds from bad actors worldwide.

But why is the real estate sector so attractive to criminals?

Real estate can be used at different stages of the money laundering process. At the placement stage, in some jurisdictions with poor money laundering frameworks properties can be bought with physical cash, with minimal or no checks on identity or source of funds. At the layering stage, property can be used to transfer and obfuscate illegal funds using complex ownership structures with shell companies or trusts obscuring the original source of funds. It’s very helpful for dealing with source of funds checks - financial institutions will often accept the explanation that funds derive from the sale of a property in a less well-regulated jurisdiction, without going further back and asking how you came to have the money to buy the property in the first place. Finally, real estate can also be used to legitimise illicit funds at the final investment or integration stage.

Other aspects of real estate’s appeal are the same features that appeal to regular investors.  Real estate is viewed as a stable investment and thus a safe place to invest, compared to speculative assets such as cryptocurrency or stocks.  In prime property markets where prices are high and generally increase over time, criminals can increase their wealth even further. And since housing prices are subjective and fluctuate over time, it is easy for them to be manipulated and over or undervalued.

A final advantage is that the high cost of property means criminals can launder large sums of money in a single transaction. As already noted, Dubai is a hot spot for luxury property transactions, being the “busiest market for $10mn-plus homes in the first quarter of 2023”, surpassing Hong Kong and New York. Reports state that the number of sales of homes in Dubai worth over $10 million has risen seventeen-fold in the last five years. For example, the average price of a villa in Dubai-Sea Mirror is around $20 million. 

While the real estate market is subject to money laundering regulations in most countries, this is seldom well enforced. In practice, anti-money laundering practices are often extremely lax or even non-existent. Even in jurisdictions with ‘respectable’ reputations, money laundering through real estate is rampant. Canadian cities Toronto and Vancouver are prime examples, being notorious for attracting nefarious actors who use the extortionate markets to absorb their funds. As public awareness of the problem increases, and housing crises caused by soaring prices continue, governments worldwide are taking steps to rectify the problem, including measures such as unexplained wealth orders and land and property ownership transparency registries.

Reasons why real estate is attractive to criminals:

  • Real estate is a stable investment that generally increases in value.
  • Pricing is subjective and overvalued houses are common, allowing real estate costs to be easily inflated.
  • As the cost of property is extremely high, criminals can launder large amounts in a single transaction.
  • Money laundering regulations for the real estate sector are seldom enforced and anti-money laundering practices are often very lax.
  • The sale of property is a good way to satisfy source of funds checks.

Common methods for money laundering 💸

One common method used to launder money through the real estate sector is purchasing a property using family and non-family proxies to avoid detection. This was clearly demonstrated in an investigation by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), which revealed a Russian national named Sergey Toni owned real estate worth over $59 million despite having no profitable businesses of visible profile. Segey Toni’s father, however, is a deputy managing director of one of the largest transportation companies in the world, the state-owned Russian Railways. Another example revealed by the OCCRP is Chen Runkai, a Chinese property developer linked to a military corruption scandal. Chen owns million-dollar properties in the same Vancouver neighbourhood as his daughter, who purchased a mansion mortgage-free for about CAD 14 million (approximately £8.1 million) at the age of 25 while listing her occupation as a ‘student’. 

Other common strategies include using anonymous front companies, especially in jurisdictions where anonymity is commonplace. This is particularly evident in the US, where certain states such as Delaware, Nevada and North Dakota allow for completely anonymous shell companies. While moves are underway in the US to create a database of beneficial ownership information, its effectiveness remains controversial. For more analysis on corporate transparency, check out FINTRAIL’s article here. The problem is widespread; anonymously held and corporate-owned real estate affects every jurisdiction with an international property market.  A recent Transparency International investigation from July 2023 revealed the scale of the problem in France, showing that “the vast majority of corporate-owned real estate in France is held anonymously”, and nearly a third of all companies have not disclosed who ultimately owns them, despite legally being required to do so. 

Criminals may also engage with third parties or trusts to be the legal owner of a property, further blurring true ownership.

What should financial institutions be doing?

For financial institutions looking to strengthen their anti-financial programmes against real estate money laundering, it’s vital to identify potential red flags and common typologies. Transactions involving real estate deals should be adequately scrutinised and the real estate industry as a whole should be considered higher-risk, potentially subject to enhanced due diligence measures. Compliance teams should focus on establishing original source of wealth and determining the ultimate beneficial owner of properties to identify nefarious actors or suspicious activity. 

Potential red flags:

  • Multiple property purchases and sales made in a short period of time
  • Over / undervaluation of property prices
  • Complex loans or credit finance (repayment can be used to mix illicit and legitimate funds)
  • Financing of property using offshore lenders
  • Unusual income (e.g. no declared income or inconsistency between declared income and th standard / value of the property)
  • Cash purchases
  • Unknown source of funds for purchases (i.e. incoming foreign wire transfers where originator/beneficiary customers are the same)
  • Ownership of property is the customer’s only link to the country where real estate is purchased
  • Straw buyers or properties purchased using family members’ names
  • Properties purchased through front companies, shell companies, trusts and complex company structures

At FINTRAIL, we combine deep financial crime risk management with industry expertise to optimise your anti-financial crime programmes. We’re here to support you in creating robust policies and procedures; refining, enhancing or testing your systems and processes; and providing context-based training to your teams. Get in touch to find out how we can help you fortify your controls in a practical and efficient way. 


Bridging the Gap: Integrating ESG Considerations with Anti-Financial Crime

Environmental, social and governance (ESG) considerations have become indispensable aspects of sustainable finance and responsible investing, generating a lot of attention and press coverage. Yet there is an important connection between ESG and financial crime which is seldom discussed.  Particularly, the harmful activities of environmental crime, such as illegal deforestation, wildlife trafficking, waste trafficking, and illegal mining, reap globally-felt negative consequences, which has prompted regulators and financial institutions to take action. Some estimates state that ESG regulations have increased by an astounding 155% over the past decade. The European Union, for example, has mandated corporate sustainability disclosures for large and listed companies since January 2023.  And in its most recent annual report, the European Banking Authority (EBA) highlighted the role of ESG risks in the prudential framework.

The three factors that comprise ESG are essential in assessing corporate reputation, investment risk, and sustainability. And both the undermining of ESG factors and the prevalence of financial crimes pose severe threats to firms and increase regulatory and financial risks. Additionally, as with all criminal activity, when ESG crimes occur, the proceeds must be laundered. This is where financial crime naturally overlaps with ESG.  A closer look at this intersection can provide valuable insight into how anti-financial crime compliance can further ESG objectives.

This article examines the relationship between ESG and anti-financial crime and the benefits of their integration, and takes a future view of how ESG will continue influencing anti-financial crime priorities and efforts.

E - Environmental 

As awareness and urgency to address climate change increase, harmful environmental practices have become more scrutinised. Climate action is no longer limited to individuals making voluntary eco-friendly choices but increasingly involves regulatory protections and legal requirements. 

Environmental crime threatens entire ecosystems, human health, and industries. It also reaps massive profits for criminals, being one of the most profitable crimes in the world. The latest figures estimate environmental crime generates $110-281 billion annually. Despite its profitability, environmental crime is perceived as a ‘low risk, high reward’ activity. A recent report on wildlife trafficking in Europe highlighted that because financial institutions lack knowledge of timber and wildlife trafficking typologies, suspicious financial transactions often go unnoticed. These unlawful activities are often linked to organised crime, corruption, and other illicit activities (e.g. environmental crimes such as illegal logging or waste trafficking reportedly fund non-state armed groups and militias, and have links to human trafficking and slave labour).

In case you missed it, check out FINTRAIL’s article on environmental crime, where we examine illegal waste trafficking, deforestation and logging. We explore how criminals typically launder the proceeds of these specific crimes and what financial institutions should do to respond.

Environmental crime has been a predicate offence in Europe since the EU’s Sixth AML Directive came into effect in 2020. In the past few years, the global authority on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), has published various guidance papers on money laundering from environmental crime and the illegal wildlife trade, marking it as a new area of awareness for financial institutions. In the reports, the FATF draws attention to links to terrorist financing and other areas of criminality.  National regulators have also released specific guidance, such as in Canada and the United States. And last year, for the first time, the Basel AML Index included environmental crime data in its methodology.

Along with a deeper analysis of environmental crime is the recognition that it undermines the sustainability goals set by the ESG framework. As illicit proceeds from environmental crime are laundered, financial institutions face reputational risk, regulatory risk, and financial risk — all of which directly concern ESG-focused investors and financial institutions.

S- Social

One of the key components of the ‘social’ pillar of ESG is human rights. Human trafficking, forced labour and modern slavery generate illicit revenue that finds its way into the legitimate financial system, directly impacting anti-financial crime programmes. Awareness of these crimes has gained significant traction in the past decade, with FATF guidance on topics such as migrant smuggling and money laundering, legislation such as the UK’s  Modern Slavery Act of 2015, and frameworks for human-rights centred sanctions programmes such as the UK’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulation 2020.  

ESG regulation relating to the ‘social’ pillar is also an important area of focus in the US, evidenced by the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which prohibits the importation of goods that were produced by forced labour in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China, and has serious implications on supply chains. While other jurisdictions have shied away from a total ban, there have been sanctions for human rights violations against the Uyghurs in places like the UK and Canada, with consequences for financial institutions’ screening programmes.

Such instances underscore the need for financial institutions to be alert to the regulatory and reputational risks associated with emerging social issues within ESG, emphasising the importance of understanding the risk a customer poses.

Case study: ESG ‘social’ pillar and anti-financial crime compliance

In 2020, the major Australian bank Westpac reached a settlement regarding more than 23 million breaches of AML laws, including failing to detect transfers involving child exploitation. The bank was fined AUD 1.3 billion ($922 million) by the regulator AUSTRAC - the biggest AML breach in Australia’s history. Among its failures, Westpac failed to implement adequate transaction monitoring scenarios to identify child exploitation risks, and to carry out appropriate monitoring and investigation of suspicious transactions.

G- Governance

Within the ESG framework, bribery and corruption are most clearly aligned with both the ‘governance’ pillar and anti-financial crime. Bribery and corruption have long been an area of focus for financial institutions in mitigating financial crime, evidenced by the need to employ special measures for managing politically exposed persons and treating them as higher risk customers. 

In updated guidance on anti-bribery and corruption (ABC) compliance programmes, the Wolfsberg Group stated that financial institutions should consider aligning their ABC programmes with “aspects of bribery and corruption risk which are connected to human rights or ESG concerns”. There have been recent reports of firms already including ESG factors within their ABC and financial crime risk rating systems and vetting clients, suppliers, and third party entities in vulnerable industries.

Integrating ESG principles with anti-financial crime strategies 

Overall, ESG is a high priority for regulators and will continue to gain significance with both official bodies and the general public.  This means that financial institutions should actively consider ESG risks as part of their risk-based approach and within their anti-financial crime programmes.

Concretely, this can mean:

  • Conducting enhanced due diligence for individuals or businesses involved in industries with a higher ESG risk (e.g. forestry, animal-related businesses)

  • Updating policies and risk appetite statements to account for ESG, and including ESG risk as part of business and customer risk assessments

  • Including ESG risk triggers in adverse media screening

  • Enhancing training on ESG risks for compliance staff, including exploring its connections to other areas of financial crime

Conclusion

Integrating ESG considerations into anti-financial crime strategies will become increasingly important as regulatory and industry bodies, like the FATF, focus on the financial aspect of environmental crimes, and as jurisdictions continue to legislate the ESG space. The connection between ESG principles and financial crime has critical implications in areas like risk assessments, screening, and due diligence. Recognising these ESG risks can mitigate financial risks, ensure regulatory compliance, and contribute to global sustainability goals. 


At FINTRAIL, we combine deep financial crime risk management with industry expertise to optimise your anti-financial crime programmes. We’re here to support you in creating robust policies and procedures; refining, enhancing or testing your systems and processes; and providing context-based training to your teams. Get in touch to find out how we can help you fortify your controls against ESG crimes and incorporate an ESG risk strategy in a practical and efficient way.


It’s not you, it’s me... Is it time to break up with your auditor?

High-profile corporate scandals and collapses such as Wirecard, Carillion, BHS, and the infamous Enron case draw out one recurring theme - how to keep auditors accountable. Conflicts of interest, poor quality and lack of independence have been the hallmarks of the recent scrutiny on audit firms across the UK and globally. As a response, reform is underway within the UK; HM Treasury has announced plans to reform the audit sector to promote quality and competition.

Whilst these reforms focus on corporate reporting, they also raise other questions - should regulated firms reflect on their financial crime audit process and is it time to shake things up?

The value of conducting a financial crime audit cannot be understated - simply put, it helps identify issues and deficiencies in your anti-financial crime (AFC) controls and systems and supports your regulatory compliance. It has long been a regulatory requirement; the Financial Conduct Authority’s Financial Crime Handbook highlights an independent audit (internal or external) to monitor effectiveness of your AFC controls as a best practice. The European Banking Authority’s Guidelines on the Roles and Responsibilities of a Compliance Officer set out a clear expectation for annual independent (internal or external) AML audits to assess the effectiveness of controls, with the findings reported to senior management.  Many partner banks also require to see financial crime audits from their account holders, with some having approved provider lists or set criteria.

With regulatory scrutiny only increasing, it is clear that a ‘check-the-box’ approach to AFC is no longer sufficient. Regulators not only expect firms to conduct an audit but are insisting audits are robust and are conducted by experienced and skilled AFC experts. This reinforces the importance of having a strong audit partner alongside strong internal controls and oversight.



We know that when you have built a strong relationship with your auditor over a number of years and they know your business well, this can be hard to walk away from. But this is often a key reason to make the leap.

Only the largest businesses in the UK are required to change auditors on a regular basis. For most firms, there is no strict obligation and it’s up to the firms to realise when they may need a fresh look from a new objective partner.

Your needs and business relationships will shift with time and circumstances. And this means your auditing needs may change, too. Sometimes it’s quite clear you need - or want - a new auditor, other times less so. However, changing your auditor periodically can bring advantages to your firm, whether that be fresh insights, a new perspective, or deeper sectoral expertise. It can:

  • Provide a new perspective - a new AFC audit firm may improve the robustness of your controls by asking different questions and taking a fresh look at your existing approach.  Having access to different industry leaders and tapping into their deep sectoral knowledge and experience may be a draw.

  • Provide objectivity - if one audit firm has reviewed your controls and processes year-in year-out, it may be more difficult for them to be objective or proactive in identifying issues that have previously been overlooked.  Working with a new audit partner helps address this potential risk.

  • Support the growth of your firm - as your firm grows you may start to offer new products or become more international, meaning that what was right for you in the past may not be right for you now. You may need an AFC audit firm with specific expertise in your current products, risks and markets.

  • Improve the quality of your current engagement - how an AFC audit is delivered matters. Audits should not adopt a one-size-fits-all approach; the ability to customise them to your needs is key.  Rather than settling for your current audit partner for the sake of simplicity, consider if there are other firms that can offer you a better service.

  • Increase value for money - price and service is often what this decision comes down too. A fair and competitive price from a firm equipped to respond to your needs quickly, with individuals willing to have open and frank discussions, will set a solid foundation for an effective and efficient audit. 

Overall, the considerations for finding the right AFC audit firm to support your needs are unique for each business. A high-value, quality audit partner will understand your type of business and its financial crime risks, know the industry well, and use that knowledge to translate information into valuable and actionable insights.  A firm that focuses on attention to detail, offers practical and implementable recommendations, provides a responsive service and establishes a trusted relationship will be the right firm for you - for a few years of course!

So what is FINTRAIL’s position?  While normally we are delighted when clients come back to us year after year, with audits we take a different view and practise what we preach!  In line with professional standards, we advise clients to rotate away from us after three years to allow for a fresh set of eyes to review their programme.  They can always come back to us down the line, but we know that rotating to another audit provider for at least a year or two will benefit them most in the long run.

About FINTRAIL

At FINTRAIL we are passionate about combating financial crime. We have extensive experience conducting audits and assurance processes for financial services businesses. Our approach focuses on both ensuring regulatory compliance, and making suggestions for how firms can improve their operational effectiveness.

We have conducted audits covering financial crime and regulatory compliance across multiple sectors including retail and personal finance, business banking, payments, forex, investment, banking-as-a-service, and crypto. We also have significant international experience, conducting multi-jurisdictional audits across Europe and APAC.

Our unique team of experts is drawn from the industries we support and has deep hands-on experience in leadership roles with leading banks, FinTechs, and other financial institutions. Our approach is tailored to the unique circumstances of each client, is regulatory and technology driven, and is focused on providing excellent customer outcomes. We offer our clients pragmatic solutions to the most complex challenges.

Our goal is to ensure our clients can thrive, free from the negative impacts of financial crime.


Unravelling the EBA Report on the Risk of Payment Institutions

Anti-money laundering and terrorist financing controls are less than 10% effective in reducing the financial crime risks of payment firms. That is according to EU anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) supervisors that gauged the sector’s inherent and residual risk levels.  In a recent report, the European Banking Authority (EBA) stated that payment firms are not doing enough to manage money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risk, and not all EU member states are doing enough to supervise the sector effectively either. Because of variance and uneven supervision across the EU, payment institutions can establish themselves in member states with less robust oversight and authorisation procedures and access the rest of the EU market through passporting. 

The report highlights some of the sector’s key risk areas, including a specific call out for remote onboarding without appropriate safeguards, cross-border activity and exposure to high risk geographies, and the risks associated with agent networks.

Key findings

  • Despite a slight improvement in the quality of business-wide and individual risk assessments, there is a poor overall awareness of ML/TF risks.

  • Remote onboarding often lacks appropriate safeguards, leading payment institutions to fail to identify high-risk customers, including politically exposed persons (PEPs).

  • Many transaction monitoring systems are deficient or not in place at all. 

  • “Emerging threats” include white labelling (i.e. where payment institutions make their licence available to independent agents that develop their own produce under the licence of the regulated financial institution) virtual IBANS, and third-party merchant acquiring.

  • The report stresses the risks associated with the use of networks of intermediaries, including agents.  There is no common EU-wide approach to the supervision of agent networks by payment institutions, or of payment institutions with widespread agent networks by regulators.  Agents’ core business is not always linked to the financial services industry, and many serve one or more payment institutions at the same time, making oversight difficult.  The EBA believes the risk has “crystallised” and that there is a high probability that agents are being exploited by criminals or criminal networks.

Comparison with the FCA

The release of the EBA’s paper comes only months after the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) published a ‘Dear CEO letter’ outlining risks and priorities for payment firms. 

While some issues are flagged by both supervisors, such as sanction screening and lack of governance for scaling firms, there are some variances. The one glaring difference is the EBA’s lack of focus on fraud. Fraud levels are endemically high In both the UK and mainland Europe and are unlikely to decline given the current economic backdrop.  As payment institutions are particularly vulnerable to this type of illicit activity, fraud’s absence in the EBA report is somewhat surprising. Additionally, the EBA’s explicit inclusion of remote onboarding as a risk suggests that certain EU institutions still struggle with this, despite comprehensive guidelines issued by the EBA and the endorsement of remote onboarding by multiple organisations including FATF.

Here are some comparative findings of common issues: 

What do payment firms need to do?

As outlined above, the FCA and EBA have both highlighted key problem areas for payment institutions.  While there are some differences in focus, it’s clear that both will require standards to be improved and risks to be better mitigated across the sector. 

As European supervisory authorities will likely increase scrutiny on the payment sector following the EBA’s report, payment firms can avoid expensive remediation and painful regulatory enforcement down the line by assessing their compliance programme and strengthening their controls now.


Contact our team for free expert advice



New Reimbursement Requirements for APP Fraud

On 7 June, the UK’s Payment Systems Regulator (PSR) published a policy statement outlining new requirements for reimbursing victims of authorised push payment (APP) fraud within the Faster Payments System.

What are the new requirements for APP fraud?

Once the regulations come into effect, currently slated for 2024, all payment service providers (PSPs) will be required to fully reimburse victims of APP fraud within five business days. There are exceptions for fraud or gross negligence by the payer, as well as an excess (value to be decided). The costs of reimbursement will be allocated equally between the sending and receiving PSPs, with a default 50:50 split. 

Why is this happening?

The need for a jolt to the system is clear; APP fraud has quickly become one of the most significant types of payment fraud globally.  The PSR reports that in 2022, there were around 207,000 reported cases on personal accounts with total losses of £485m (but notes this is likely an underestimate).

The authorities’ proposed solution as set out in this statement is also clear - shifting the onus for tackling APP fraud onto financial institutions and giving them a clear financial incentive to prevent it happening in the first place.   The PSR says that by adopting an outcome-based approach, it is giving the industry “the space to innovate and to choose how best to deliver the new reimbursement requirement” - i.e. moving away from tick-box compliance to focus on effectiveness. 

What does this mean for PSPs?

The implications for financial services firms are huge. For some, if they are not able to get their houses in order, the estimated costs could pose an existential threat large enough to put them out of business. We have spoken with industry contacts who have  told us that some institutions and EMI agents  are unlikely to survive under the new regime without significant changes, given how vulnerable they are to APP fraud. We know of estimated liability figures that are significant multiples above current fraud losses. Firms need to take meaningful, decisive action to protect themselves and their customers, to significantly improve how they identify inbound APP fraud related payments on their own books and identify and protect their customers as victims.

What does the PSR expect?

The PSR says it expects industry to start working “now” to implement the new requirements, beginning by allocating appropriate resources and understanding how they can meet the conditions. Specifically, firms should move towards adopting a stronger risk-based approach to payments, and make better decisions on when to intervene and hold or stop a payment. The PSR believes the requirements will lead firms to “innovate and develop effective, data-driven interventions to change customer behaviour” - a message that is music to FINTRAIL’s ears!

What can PSPs do?

So where should payment firms start?  There are numerous parts of an anti-financial crime framework which play a role in reducing APP Fraud exposure - all of which need to be assessed and enhanced:

  • Customer due diligence, including identity verification

  • Customers as victims; assessing vulnerability and improving awareness

  • Customer risk assessments, considering payment sending and receiving exposure

  • Ongoing monitoring, including transaction and other activity monitoring

  • Operational enhancements to process monitoring interventions and reimbursement claims

  • Responsiveness to peer institutions and law enforcement

  • Use of internal data and financial intelligence

  • Robust assurance of fraud controls

  • Staff training

How can we help?

FINTRAIL is here to help PSPs adapt to the new requirements. Over the last five years we have worked with a range of institutions to successfully reduce their APP fraud exposure. With our proven track record we can offer a range of innovative, data-driven services to improve the effectiveness of your fraud controls and enable better identification of fraud risks.

For firms considering where to start, we can conduct a thorough, data-driven risk assessment to identify current weaknesses in frameworks and controls and recommend practical enhancements that will reduce your potential liability exposure. This may include product and feature changes/enhancements, customer vulnerability assessments, new transaction monitoring scenarios, or enhancements to your customer risk assessment model. We can also conduct targeted audits of existing controls, or provide assurance and validation of programme changes being introduced to meet the new reimbursement requirements.

Speak to our team to find out more



Auditing your Fraud Controls: Ensuring Confidence in your Anti-Fraud Programme

It’s no secret that fraud is one of the most pressing threats to financial institutions, exacerbated by stormy economic conditions. The most recent fraud report by UK Finance calls attention to post-pandemic unauthorised and authorised fraud trends, underlining the continuance of social engineering schemes which manipulate victims into forfeiting sensitive details or transferring funds. Overall, the report puts UK fraud losses at an outstanding £1.2 billion for 2022, which is equivalent to over £2,300 every minute.

These high fraud rates correlate with increasing regulatory expectations for firms to remedy weaknesses in their systems and controls. Most recently, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) emphasised fraud as a priority area in a Dear CEO letter outlining immediate actions for financial institutions to take.  These include the need to review risk appetite statements to ensure they adequately address the risk of fraud to customers, maintaining appropriate customer due diligence controls to prevent accounts from receiving proceeds of fraud, and regularly reviewing fraud prevention systems and controls to ensure effectiveness.


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To address recent regulatory guidance on fraud for financial institutions, FINTRAIL has increased the scope of our fraud assessments as part of our standard audit offering. To find out how we can support your audit process and associated fraud controls, get in touch with our team.


This priority area corresponds with the UK government’s express inclusion of fraud as part of the most recent Economic Crime Plan and the launch of its fraud strategy, which is one of the most progressive in the world. The focus on fraud is not isolated to the UK alone; the United State’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has also made it clear that combating fraud is a top priority, with the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) also funnelling resources into anti-fraud initiatives. In view of this, we can expect further regulatory attention and enforcement concerning fraud.

As fraud remains a huge and growing financial crime threat on a global scale, regulators will not only require firms to have robust fraud controls as part of an effective anti-financial programme but also increase their scrutiny of regulated entities in this area.  Having an appropriate fraud strategy and mitigation measures in place directly translates to effectiveness in anti-financial crime controls, meaning financial institutions should ensure and fortify their framework.

In light of this fraud threat landscape and the associated regulatory expectations, FINTRAIL has increased the scope of fraud assessment as part of our standard audit offering, and also created a fraud audit checklist to help ensure that your anti-financial crime framework is primed and prepared for the risks it faces.


Download your copy of our Fraud Controls Checklist:

What areas does the checklist cover?

  • Risk Assessment and Risk Appetite

  • Governance and Management Information

  • Policies and Procedures

  • Customer Due Diligence

  • Enhanced Due Diligence

  • Anti-Fraud Systems and Controls

  • Customer Screening

  • Transaction Monitoring

  • Reporting and Information Sharing

  • Training and awareness

  • Assurance and Audit

  • Horizon Scanning



Quality Control and Quality Assurance

In this post, we aim to take a close look at an often overlooked element of a good financial crime compliance programme - the process(es) of quality control (QC) and quality assurance (QA).   

It is one thing (a very good thing!) to have thorough policies and procedures and carefully designed controls, but it is another to understand if they are actually working properly. To this end, regulated institutions need to adopt frameworks to embed appropriate QC / QA practices. These activities are critical in ensuring the integrity of fincrime compliance processes, ensuring regulatory compliance, and safeguarding against illicit activities. In this article, we look at the significance of QC and QA and highlight their key components.

Definitions

First, let’s clear up a common area of confusion and clarify the difference between QC and QA. Both are crucial elements of a comprehensive compliance programme, but each serves a distinct purpose:

Quality control

A check to confirm that a process is being applied consistently and effectively, in line with documented processes or procedures.

QC  is a control mechanism that involves detecting, analysing and rectifying compliance issues in real time, to identify if analysts are adhering to policies and procedures, and to take remedial actions if not.  

QC can be characterised as a reactive or corrective process.  It happens in near real time, meaning errors or shortcomings can be corrected almost straightaway.

QC is traditionally owned by the first line of defence.  It can be done by the same team(s) which performs the task being assessed. For instance, a senior team member may review one in every five tasks completed by a more junior team member (a ‘four-eyes review’).

Quality assurance

An objective review of the outcome of a specific process or control.  QA ensures a process has been followed correctly and reviews the outcome to identify weaknesses or room for improvement in the future.

QA is a proactive measure designed to ensure controls and processes are working effectively and are compliant with regulations.  

QA is more retrospective than QC, as it involves looking back over actions taken in the past, meaning it is designed to improve controls and processes in the future rather than address errors as they occur.

QA is traditionally owned by the second line of defence, i.e. compliance. This ensures it is objective, as one team reviews the work of another.

A key component of QA is sample testing, i.e. checking and validating a sample of completed activity at set intervals to confirm if appropriate standards have been met and if relevant policies and procedures have been followed.

Considerations for Success

Quality Control

  1. Ensure you map out all the processes which require QC.

  2. Consider proportionality. How frequently should you perform QC?  What percentage of tasks are you performing QC on? 

  3. Take a risk-based approach to QC. Increase the number / percentage of tasks checked for new joiners, poor performers or higher-risk scenarios.

  4. Ensure you have sufficient resources to perform QC. 

  5. Ensure you do something meaningful with the output, e.g. enhancing procedures or providing training.

Quality Assurance

  1. Set out a QA monitoring programme for the year. You don’t need to do it all at once, and you may not need to cover everything in one year if you deem that appropriate.

  2. Take a risk-based approach. Are there any areas that need an urgent deep dive? When was the last time particular controls received assurance? If you conducted QA on a process last year and the results were positive, maybe focus your time/resource somewhere else.

  3. Be aware of regulatory changes and horizon scanning. 

  4. Ensure you do something meaningful with the output, e.g. policy updates or system enhancements.  You should also feed the findings into your firm’s risk assessment to measure residual risks.

In conclusion, QC and QA are integral components of a robust financial crime compliance programme. By proactively implementing QA measures to improve processes and reacting swiftly to issues through QC practices, organisations can minimise the risk of illicit activities, safeguard their reputations, and comply with regulatory obligations.


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